Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions by Compiani, Giovanni et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
6-1-2018 
Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous 
Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions 
Giovanni Compiani 
Philip A. Haile 
Marcelo Sant'Anna 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Compiani, Giovanni; Haile, Philip A.; and Sant'Anna, Marcelo, "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, 
and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions" (2018). Cowles Foundation Discussion 
Papers. 131. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/131 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
 
   
COMMON VALUES, UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY, AND 
ENDOGENOUS ENTRY IN U.S. OFFSHORE OIL LEASE AUCTIONS 
By 
Giovanni Compiani, Philip Hailey, and Marcelo Sant'Anna 
June 2018 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2137 
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
http://cowles.yale.edu/ 
Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and
Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions∗






An oil lease auction is the classic example motivating a common values model. How-
ever, formal testing for common values has been hindered by unobserved auction-level
heterogeneity, which is likely to affect both participation in an auction and bidders’
willingness to pay. We develop and apply an empirical approach for first-price sealed
bid auctions with affiliated values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder
entry. The approach also accommodates spatial dependence and sample selection.
Following Haile, Hong and Shum (2003), we specify a reduced form for bidder entry
outcomes and rely on an instrument for entry. However, we relax their control function
requirements and demonstrate that our specification is generated by a fully specified
game motivated by our application. We show that important features of the model
are nonparametrically identified and propose a semiparametric estimation approach
designed to scale well to the moderate sample sizes typically encountered in practice.
Our empirical results show that common values, affiliated private information, and
unobserved heterogeneity—three distinct phenomena with different implications for
policy and empirical work—are all present and important in U.S. offshore oil and gas
lease auctions. We find that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in the empirical model
obscures the presence of common values. We also examine the interaction between affil-
iation, the winner’s curse, and the number of bidders in determining the aggressiveness
of bidding and seller revenue.
∗We are grateful to Ken Hendricks and Rob Porter, who generously provided the data, answered our
many questions, and gave valuable feedback on early drafts. We also benefited from the comments of Estelle
Cantillon, Xiaohong Chen, and numerous seminar and conference participants.
1 Introduction
In many auction settings it is natural to presume that important information com-
monly known among bidders is unobserved by the econometrician. Ignoring such
unobserved heterogeneity can lead to a variety of errors. One may infer too much
within-auction correlation in bidders’ private information, as well as too much cross-
auction variation in this information, leading to incorrect conclusions about such
issues as bidder market power, the division of surplus, and optimal auction design.1
In a first-price auction, unobserved heterogeneity presents a particular challenge be-
cause standard identification approaches exploit the insight that bidders’ equilibrium
beliefs about the competition can be inferred from observed distributions of rivals’
bids.2 With unobserved auction-level heterogeneity, bidders’ beliefs condition on in-
formation unavailable to the econometrician. A further problem is that auction-level
unobservables are likely to affect not only bids but also bidder participation. Such en-
dogenous bidder entry threatens several identification and testing approaches relying
on exogenous variation in the level of competition.3
We propose an empirical model of entry and bidding in first-price auctions with
affiliated values and unobserved heterogeneity. We show nonparametric identifica-
tion of key features and propose a semiparametric estimation approach. We apply
the approach to auctions of offshore oil and gas leases in the United States Outer
Continental Shelf (“OCS”) to evaluate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity,
test the hypothesis of equilibrium bidding, assess the effect of competition on bidding
and revenues, and test for common values. The last of these is of particular interest.
1See, e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2011), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey, Levin, and Seira
(2011), and Roberts (2013).
2See, e.g., Laffont and Vuong (1993), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Li, Perrigne, and
Vuong (2002), Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003), and Athey and Haile (2006, 2007).
3See, e.g., Gilley and Karels (1981), Athey and Haile (2002), Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003),
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), Campo, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2011), and Gillen (2010).
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Common values can have important implications in the auction context and beyond
(e.g., Akerlof (1970)), and an auction’s clear rules offer hope of confronting our intu-
ition about latent information structures with formal hypothesis testing in a setting
where the model can be tightly linked to the actual market institution. Although
an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of a common values setting,
formal testing for common values has been hindered by the confounding effects of
unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, we reject private values in favor of common val-
ues only when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry. More
broadly, we find that affiliated private information, common values, and common
knowledge unobservables—three distinct phenomena with different implications for
policy and empirical work4—are all present and important in OCS auctions.
Our empirical study is perhaps most closely related to that of Hendricks, Pinkse,
and Porter (2003) (“HPP”), who focused on testable implications of a pure common
values model.5 Our work is complementary to that of HPP. We allow the pure com-
mon values model but do not assume it, and we neither exploit nor rely on estimates
of realized tract values. HPP point out that tests for common values would be difficult
to apply due to likely correlation between bidder entry and auction-level unobserv-
ables.6 Our study also complements the simultaneous work of Aradillas-Lopez, Haile,
Hendricks, and Porter (2017), which evaluates implications of competitive bidding in
OCS auctions following the introduction of “area-wide leasing” in 1983. Here we con-
sider only the period 1954–1983, when the evidence in Haile, Hendricks, and Porter
4For example, affiliation leads to the “linkage principle” (Milgrom and Weber (1982), Milgrom
(1987)) whereas common values leads to the “winner’s curse,” each with important implications
for auction design. Unobserved heterogeneity, which is held fixed in auction theory, implies neither
affiliation nor common values but creates challenges for identification.
5Earlier work on OCS auctions includes Gilley and Karels (1981), Hendricks, Porter, and
Boudreau (1987), Hendricks and Porter (1988), and Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989).
6HPP partially control for unobserved heterogeneity by conditioning on two categories of tracts–
those with high or low numbers of potential bidders, measured as the number of large firms ever to
bid on a tract within a certain distance of the tract offered.
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(2010) and Aradillas-Lopez et al. supports the assumption of competitive bidding.
Prior work on testing for common values in auctions includes Paarsch (1992),
Athey and Haile (2002), Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003), HHS, Hill and Schneyerov
(2014), and Hortaçsu and Kastl (2012). Most of this work, like ours, exploits the
fact that in a common values auction the winner’s curse becomes more severe as the
number of competitors grows (all else equal). Our approach to identification and
testing is most similar to that in HHS, who studied timber auctions. We drop their
assumptions of discrete unobserved heterogeneity and entry outcomes that are strictly
increasing in the unobservable. This makes the identification problem substantially
more challenging and requires a different estimation strategy.
We are not the first to consider first-price auctions with unobserved heterogeneity.
Haile and Kitamura (2018) review existing econometric approaches. All require com-
promises. Several (e.g., Krasnokutskaya (2011), Hu, McAdams, and Shum (2013))
require that bidders have independent types, so that all correlation among bids can
be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity.7 Other approaches use a control function
strategy requiring strict monotonicity between an observed outcome and the unob-
served heterogeneity (e.g., Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003), Haile, Hong, and
Shum (2003) (“HHS”), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2009), Roberts (2013)). Simul-
taneous work by Kitamura and Laage (2017) proposes an approach allowing affiliated
types but requiring that the unobservable be discrete (cf. HHS and Hu, McAdams,
and Shum (2013)) and enter through a separable structure similar to that in Kras-
nokutskaya (2011). Finally, while control function approaches can provide a strategy
for isolating exogenous variation in bidder entry, others generally do not.
Our approach requires compromises as well. We rely on an index assumption
similar to that in Krasnokutskaya (2011) and Kitamura and Laage (2017) and spec-
7See also the partial identification results in Armstrong (2013). An exception among approaches
building on the measurement error literature is Balat (2011). His extension of Hu, McAdams, and
Shum (2013) exploits observation of potential bidders’ entry decisions at two sequential stages.
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ify only a reduced form for bidder entry. The latter rules out selective entry8 and
cannot be used to evaluate interventions that would alter the map between auction
characteristics and entry outcomes.9 And like HHS, we require an instrument for
entry. But our approach also offers advantages that are attractive for our applica-
tion. It avoids the requirement of independent bidder types and provides a strategy
for exploiting exogenous sources of variation in bidder entry. This combination of
features is particularly important in our application. Common values settings gener-
ally demand that we allow correlated types (signals), and our test for common values
exploits exogenous variation in entry arising through an instrumental variable. We
also avoid the strict monotonicity requirement of the control function approach and
show that our empirical model can be derived from a two-stage game motivated by
our application—an entry stage à la Berry (1992) in which bidders choose whether
to acquire a signal of the good’s value, followed by competitive bidding à la Milgrom
and Weber (1982). In this example, unobserved heterogeneity may have arbitrary
dimension; may exhibit spatial dependence and correlation with observables; and
may affect sample selection. Finally, although we require an instrument satisfying
certain conditions for point identification, our formal analysis also isolates the extent
to which one would rely on parametric structure for identification if in practice one
has instruments generating only limited (even no) variation in entry.
The following section describes our model. In Section 3 we address nonparametric
identification. Section 4 describes our proposed estimation method. We then narrow
our focus to the OCS oil lease auctions, with baseline estimates presented in section
5. We present the tests for common values in section 6, with several alternative
specifications examined in section 7. We conclude in section 8.
8cf. Marmer, Schneyerov, and Xu (2013), Gentry and Li (2014), Bhattacharya, Roberts, and
Sweeting (2014), or Kong (2017a).
9However, once the bidding model is identified it may become possible to identify a given struc-
tural model of entry consistent with the reduced form, allowing evaluation of such counterfactuals.
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2 Model
We consider a standard model of first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric affili-
ated values, extended to allow for auction-level heterogeneity and endogenous bidder
entry. Each auction t is associated with observed characteristics Xt ∈ X and a scalar
unobservable Ut. Without further loss, we let Ut be uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
We also assume independence between Xt and Ut.
Assumption 1. Xt |= Ut.
The restriction to a scalar unobservable independent of Xt is less restrictive than
it appears. We show below that this representation can be derived—without loss
of generality for most purposes motivating estimation of an auction model—from a
model in which auction-level unobservables have arbitrary dimension and arbitrary
dependence with Xt. In that model, the weak monotonicity conditions required below
are also obtained as results rather than assumptions.
For each auction t we postulate a two-stage process in which entry is followed by
bidding. We do not specify a particular model of entry; rather, we posit a reduced
form for the entry outcome and assume Bayes Nash equilibrium in the auction stage.
The number of bidders entering auction t is denoted by Nt. Bidders are assumed
risk neutral. Bidder i’s valuation for the good offered is denoted by Vit. Upon
entering, i observes a private signal Sit ∈ [s, s] of Vit. Let Vt = (V1t, . . . , VNtt),
St = (S1t, . . . , SNtt), and S−it = St\Sit.
The bidding stage follows Milgrom and Weber (1982). The realizations of (Nt, Xt, Ut)
are common knowledge among bidders, as is the distribution of (St, Vt) | (Nt, Xt, Ut).10
10Although standard, the assumption that bidders observe Nt may be inappropriate in some
applications. In our model of entry outcomes below, Nt is completely determined by factors common
knowledge among bidders. HPP point out that in OCS auctions, rivals’ joint bidding agreements
and participation in follow-up seismic surveys are typically known, and that bidders performing a
follow-up survey submit bids on roughly 80% of the tracts analyzed. Nonetheless, this leaves some
room for uncertainty about the level of competition faced. One challenge in relaxing our assumption
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In addition, each bidder i knows the signal Sit. Let FSV (St, Vt|Nt, Xt, Ut) denote the
joint distribution of signals and valuations conditional on (Nt, Xt, Ut). We make the
following standard assumptions on this conditional distribution.
Assumption 2. (i) For all n ∈suppNt| (Xt, Ut), FSV (St, Vt|n,Xt, Ut) has a con-
tinuously differentiable joint density that is affiliated, exchangeable in the indices
i = 1, . . . , n, and positive on (s, s)n × (v, v)n; (ii) E[Vit|Sit, S−it, Nt, Xt, Ut] exists and
is strictly increasing in Sit.
Because the bidding stage involves a standard affiliated values model, it nests
a variety of special cases. With private values, E[Vit|Sit, S−it, Nt, Xt, Ut] does not
depend on S−it. In our setting this is equivalent to bidders’ knowing their valuations,
i.e., Sit = Vit = w(Sit;Nt, Xt, Ut). When E[Vit|Sit, S−it, Nt, Xt, Ut] depends on S−it,
we have common values (or interdependent values). A special case of the common
values model is that of pure common values, where Vit = V̄t for all i.
A conditional expectation of particular relevance for what follows is
w(sit;nt, xt, ut) ≡ E
[
Vit
∣∣∣∣Sit = maxj 6=i Sjt = sit, Nt = nt, Xt = xt, Ut = ut
]
.
This is a bidder’s expected value of winning the auction conditional on all common
knowledge information, the observed private signal, and the event (typically counter-
factual) that this signal ties for the highest among all bidders at the auction. This
expectation plays an important role in the theory because, when equilibrium bidding
strategies turn out to be strictly increasing in signals, tying for the highest signal
means that even arbitrarily small deviations from one’s equilibrium bid will change
the identity of the winner. We therefore refer to w(sit;nt, xt, ut) as bidder i’s “pivotal
expected value” at auction t. Pivotal expected values also play a central role in our
is the need to specify precisely the information available to bidders when forming expectations of
the competition. This is an important topic that we leave to future work.
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strategy for discriminating between private values and common values.
We impose the following restriction on how the auction characteristics (Xt, Ut)
affect bidder valuations.
Assumption 3. (i) Vit = Γ (Xt, Ut)V
0
it ; (ii) conditional onNt, (V
0
1t, . . . , V
0
Ntt
, S1t, . . . , SNtt)
is independent of (Xt, Ut); (iii) Γ is bounded and weakly increasing in Ut.
Assumption 3 is an index restriction requiring multiplicative separability in (Xt, Ut)
and weak monotonicity in Ut.
11 An assumption of multiplicative (or additive) separa-
bility has often been relied upon in the auctions literature, including for identification
in other settings with unobserved heterogeneity. Our identification result will rely on
this assumption as well.12 Without further loss, we normalize the scale of Γ relative
to that of V 0it by taking an arbitrary point x






We assume initially that the auction is conducted without a binding reserve
price, although below we consider an extension allowing a random reserve price.
Under Assumption 2, the auction stage of our model admits a unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in weakly increasing strategies; these strategies, which we denote by
β(·;Xt, Ut, Nt) : [s, s] → R, are symmetric and strictly increasing.13 Let the random
variable Bit = β (Sit;Xt, Ut, Nt) denote the equilibrium bid of bidder i in auction t,
with Bt denoting (B1t, . . . , BNtt).
11Without a distributional restriction like that in part (ii) of the assumption, part (i) would have
no content. And because more “desirable” realizations of the unobservable state can be labeled with
larger values, the monotonicity restriction in (iii) only rules out variation with Xt in the partial
order on the unobservable implied by desirability (see also Example 1 and Appendix A).
12For for what follows it is sufficient that the conditional expectations E[Vit|St, Xt, Ut, Nt] take
the multiplicatively separable form. This weaker condition will be more natural when these ex ante
conditional expectations are positive even though Vit may take negative values.
13See Theorem 2.1 in Athey and Haile (2007) and the associated references. Milgrom and Weber
(1982) characterize the equilibrium strategies.
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A useful fact is that the separability required by Assumption 3 is is inherited by
the equilibrium bidding strategies.14 Thus, under Assumptions 2 and 3 we may write
β (Sit;Xt, Ut, Nt) = Γ (Xt, Ut) β
0 (Sit;Nt) , (2)
where β0 denotes the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for a
(possibly hypothetical) auction t at which Γ (Xt, Ut) = Γ (x
0, 0) = 1. Following HHS,
we refer to B0it = β
0 (Sit;Nt) and V
0
it as “homogenized” bids and valuations.
We link the model of a single auction to the observed sample through Assumption
4. Given Assumption 3, this is the standard assumption that auctions are i.i.d.
conditional on auction characteristics, (Nt, Xt, Ut). However, we do not require Ut to
be independent across auctions.
Assumption 4. (V 0t , St) |= (V 0t′ , St′) for t′ 6= t.
Finally, we specify the outcome of the entry stage by supposing that the number
of bidders at auction t satisfies
Nt = η (Xt, Zt, Ut) (3)
for some function η that is weakly increasing in Ut. Formally, (3) is an assumed
reduced form for the entry outcome. The weak monotonicity requirement links the
interpretation of the unobservable in the entry and bidding stages: unobservables that
make the good for sale more valuable also encourage more entry. The new variable
Zt in (3) is an exogenous auction-specific observable that affects bidder entry but is
otherwise excludable from the auction model, as formalized in Assumption 5.
Assumption 5. (i) Zt |= Ut|Xt; (ii) Zt |= (St, V 0t )|Nt.
14See, e.g., HHS, Athey and Haile (2007), or Krasnokutskaya (2011).
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The following example, discussed more fully in Appendix A, describes one fully
specified two-stage game leading to the structure assumed above.
Example 1. Consider a model of entry and bidding for an OCS oil and gas lease,
where a standard simultaneous move entry stage à la Berry (1992) precedes a compet-
itive bidding stage à la Milgrom and Weber (1982). Players in the game are firms in
the industry. The tract offered for lease is associated with observables Xt, which in-
cludes (among other relevant covariates) the number of active leases on neighbor tracts
and the sets of bidders for those leases.15 The active neighbor leases are owned by Zt
distinct neighbor firms. Tract-level unobservables are denoted by Et. Et may have
arbitrary dimension, may be correlated with Xt, and may be spatially correlated. The
characteristics Xt and Et are assumed to scale valuations (multiplicatively) through a
bounded index λ (Xt, Et). Firms play a two-stage game. They first choose simultane-
ously whether to enter, with each entering firm i incurring a signal acquisition cost
ci(Xt). Signal acquisition costs are common knowledge and lower for neighbor firms
than other (non-neighbor) firms.16 Entrants learn their private signals and the number
of entrants, then participate in a first-price sealed bid auction with symmetric affili-
ated values. Appendix A shows that all pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (with
weakly increasing strategies in the bidding stage) can be represented by the model and
assumptions above. This representation is obtained by defining Ut = Fλ (λ(xt, Et)|xt),
where Fλ(·|x) is the CDF of the random variable λ(x,Et). Observe that in this case
the distribution of Ut does not vary with Xt, although its interpretation does.
17
15Tracts s and t are defined to be neighbors if their boundaries coincide at some point.
16This structure generalizes that in Hendricks and Porter (1988), where neighbors obtain a private
signal for free but non-neighbors face an infinite cost of signal acquisition.
17In that case, knowledge of the function Γ will not be sufficient to characterize the effects of a
ceteris paribus change in Xt on bidder valuations. See the additional discussion in Appendix A.
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3 Nonparametric Identification
In this section we develop sufficient conditions for identification of the entry model,
the index function Γ, and key features of the bidding model. We address each of
these in turn. Throughout we assume that the observables include Xt, Zt, Nt and
Bt.
18 Let Y denote the support of (Xt, Zt), and let Y (n) denote the support of
(Xt, Zt) conditional on Nt = n. Let n ≥ 0 denote the minimum value in the support
of Nt; let n denote the maximum. Recalling (1), for convenience we take x
0 such
that for some z we have (x0, z) ∈ Y (n).
3.1 Identification of the Entry Model
We show identification of the entry model under the following regularity condition on
the support of Nt|(Xt, Zt).
Assumption 6. For all (x, z) ∈ Y, there exist n (x, z) and n (x, z) such that η (x, z, Ut)
has support (n (x, z) , n (x, z) + 1, . . . , n (x, z)) .
Given Assumption 6, for any (x, z) ∈ Y, the function η (x, z, ·) is characterized by
the thresholds
τn(x,z)−1 (x, z) ≤ τn(x,z) (x, z) ≤ ... ≤ τn(x,z),
where
τn(x,z)−1 (x, z) = 0, τn(x,z) (x, z) = 1, (4)
and for n = {n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z)},
τn−1 (x, z) = inf {u ∈ [0, 1] : η (x, z, u) ≥ n} .
18In some applications, data may available only for auctions attracting at least one bidder. In
Appendix A we show that, within the fully specified model of Example 1, our maintained assumptions
and analysis remain valid in the presence of such sample selection. Our examination of the OCS
auction data will exploit this result.
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With this observation, identification of η follows easily.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, η is identified.
Proof. Take arbitrary (x, z) ∈ Y. For each n ∈ {n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z)},
Pr (Nt = n|Xt = x, Zt = z) = Pr (τn−1 (x, z) ≤ Ut ≤ τn (x, z) |Xt = x, Zt = z)
= τn (x, z)− τn−1 (x, z) . (5)
The probabilities on the left are observed. Thus, using (4), equation (5) can be solved
iteratively for the unknown thresholds τn (x, z) starting from n = n (x, z). 
Identification of η determines the effects of Zt on bidder entry and provides bounds
τnt−1(xt, zt) and τnt(xt, zt) on the realization of each unobservable Ut. As shown in
the following corollary (proved in Appendix B), it also determines the distribution of
Ut conditional on (Xt, Nt).
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, the distribution of Ut|(Xt, Nt) is identified.
3.2 Identification of the Index Function
Define
γ (x, u) = ln Γ (x, u) .






{τn−1(x, z), τn(x, z)} .
We then give additional conditions guaranteeing that Ux = [0, 1] for each x. We begin
with the following result, whose proof illustrates a key argument.
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Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x′, z′) ∈
Y (n), the differences γ (x′, τn (x′, z′))−γ (x, τn (x, z)) and γ (x′, τn−1 (x′, z′))−γ (x, τn−1 (x, z))
are identified.
Proof. By (2) and monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function,
inf { lnBit|Nt = n,Xt = x, Zt = z} = γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) + ln β0 (s;n) .
So under Assumptions 1–6, for any n and all (x, z) and (x′, z′) in Y (n), the differences
γ (x′, τn−1 (x
′, z′))− γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) (6)
are identified.19 Similarly, since
sup { lnBit|Nt = n,Xt = x, Zt = z} = γ (x, τn (x, z)) + ln β0 (s;n) ,
we obtain identification of the differences
γ (x′, τn (x
′, z′))− γ (x, τn (x, z)) (7)
for all n and all (x, z) and (x′, z′) in Y (n). 
Thus far we have not imposed any requirement on the support of Zt or its effect
on entry outcomes. Below we will do so in order to obtain point identification of γ.
However, even in the case that no instrument is available, Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and
Lemma 1 still hold. And once γ is known, Zt plays no further role in the identification
results. Thus, while we rely on an instrument to obtain point identification, this
reliance is formally limited to ensuring that we can move from the partial identification
19Because β0(s;n) = E[V 0it |Sjt = s, j = 1, . . . , n] and β0(s;n) ≤ E[V 0it |Sjt = s, j = 1, . . . , n] for all
s (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982)), both β0(s;n) and β0(s;n) are finite under Assumption 2.
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of γ provided by Lemma 1 to point identification of γ.
As a step toward point identification, we introduce two additional assumptions.
These allow us to show that the first differences obtained above can be differenced
again, cancelling common terms, to obtain a set of first differences sufficient to pin
down the value of the index γ(x, u) at all x and u ∈ Ux.
Assumption 7. For all n ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n}, Y (n− 1) ∩ Y (n) is nonempty.
Assumption 8. There exists n∗ such that
(i) ∀n ∈ {n, . . . , n∗}, Y contains points (x (n) , z (n)) and (x (n) , ẑ (n)) such that
n (x (n) , z (n)) = n and n (x (n) , ẑ (n)) = n+ 1; and
(ii) ∀n ∈ {n∗, . . . , n}, Y contains points (x′ (n) , z′ (n)) and (x′ (n) , ẑ′ (n)) such that
n (x′ (n) , z′ (n)) = n and n (x′ (n) , ẑ′ (n)) = n− 1.
Assumption 7 requires variation in Ut that produces local variation in entry. For
example, this rules out trivial cases in which Ut has no effect on Nt. Assumption 8
requires variation in the instrument Zt that can induce local variation in the support
of the entry outcomes, at least at some values of Xt.
We prove the following results in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x′, z′) ∈
Y (n), γ (x, τn (x, z))− γ (x′, τn−1 (x′, z′)) is identified.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n and all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), the values
of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) and γ (x, τn (x, z)) are identified.
By Theorem 1, the values of τn−1 (x, z) and τn (x, z) are known for all n and
(x, z) ∈ Y (n). Thus, Lemma 3 demonstrates identification of γ (x, u) at each x ∈ X
and u ∈ Ux. In general, this may still deliver only partial identification of the index
function γ, so that in practice one may rely on parametric structure to interpolate
between the points {x ∈ X, u ∈ Ux} at which γ (x, u) is nonparametrically point
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identified. However, the following conditions are sufficient to ensure that no such
interpolation is necessary.
Assumption 9. (a) For all x ∈ X, suppZt|Xt = x is connected.
(b) For all (x, z, u) ∈ Y× (0, 1) and all δ > 0 such that (u− δ, u+ δ) ⊂ (0, 1),
there exists ε > 0 such that if ‖z′ − z‖ < ε then η (x, z′, u′) = η (x, z, u) for some
u′ ∈ (u− δ, u+ δ).
Assumption 10. For every x ∈ X there exists a finite partition 0 = τ 0(x) < τ 1(x) <
· · · < τK(x)(x) = 1 of the unit interval such that for each k = 1, . . . , K(x) and some
z(k), z′(k) ∈suppZt|Xt = x, η
(




x, z′(k), τ k(x)
)
.
Assumption 9 rules out discrete instruments and requires a type of continuous
substitution between Zt and Ut in the “production” of bidder entry: it must be
possible to offset the effect (on entry) of a small change in Zt with a small change in
Ut. Assumption 10 requires that variation in Zt have sufficient effect on participation
to offset some discrete variation in the unobservable Ut. A sufficient condition is that
for each x there exist z and z′ such that η (x, z, τn−1 (x, z)) > η (x, z
′, τn (x, z)) for all
n ∈ {n (x, z) , . . . , n (x, z)}; in this case, the set
{
τn(x,z)−1, . . . , τn(x,z)
}
could define the
partition τ 0(x) < τ 1(x) < · · · < τK(x).
The following lemma, whose proof is provided in Appendix B, leads us to the
point identification of γ (and therefore Γ) demonstrated in Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1–9, τn−1 (Xt, Zt) is continuous in Zt on the pre-
image of (0, 1) .
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–10, Γ is identified on X× [0, 1] .
Proof. We need only show that Ux = [0, 1] for each x ∈ X. For arbitrary x ∈
X, let 0 = τ 0(x) < τ 1(x) < · · · < τK(x)(x) = 1 be as in Assumption 10. Take
any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K(x)} and let z = z(k) and z′ = z′(k) be as in Assumption
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10. Let n = η
(













x, z′, τ k(x)
)
< n and, therefore,
τn−1 (x, z) ≤ τ k−1(x) < τ k(x) ≤ τn−1(x, z′).
Because the continuous image of a connected set is connected, Lemma 4 and Assump-
tion 9 (part (a)) imply that for every τ̃ ∈
[
τ k−1(x), τ k(x)
]





= τ̃ . 
3.3 Identification of the Bidding Model
We now demonstrate identification of the joint distribution of the pivotal expected
values (w(S1t;n, x, u), . . . , w(Snt;n, x, u)) for all x ∈ X, u ∈ [0, 1], and n in the sup-
port of Nt|{Xt = x, Ut = u}. For a private values model, where Vit = Sit, this is
equivalent to identification of the joint distribution of bidder valuations conditional
on (Xt, Nt, Ut). Thus, Theorem 3 below demonstrates identification of the affiliated
private values model. Without the restriction to private values, our result here pro-
vides an important form of partial identification.20 For our empirical application, for
example, this is sufficient to allow us to test the hypotheses of equilibrium bidding
in the affiliated values model and to test the hypothesis of private values against the
alternative of common values.
Let





∣∣∣∣Bit = b,Xt = x, Ut = u,Nt = n) ,
and let gM |B (m|b, x, u, n) denote the associated conditional density (guaranteed to
20Without additional information or structure, common values models are not identified from
bidding data. See, e.g., Laffont and Vuong (1993) and Athey and Haile (2002).
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exist by Assumption 2 and strict monotonicity of the equilibrium bid function). Fol-
lowing Laffont and Vuong (1993), Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), and Li, Per-
rigne, and Vuong (2000, 2002), one can characterize the relationship between each
realized w(sit;nt, xt, ut) and the associated equilibrium bid bit = β (sit;xt, ut, nt) in
terms of the joint distribution of equilibrium bids. In particular, each bit must satisfy
the first-order condition21
w(sit;nt, xt, ut) = bit +
GM |B (bit|bit, xt, ut, nt)
gM |B (bit|bit, xt, ut, nt)
. (8)
Although this equation expresses the pivotal expected value w(sit;nt, xt, ut) as a
functional of a conditional distribution of bids, the presence of ut on the right-hand
side creates challenges. Because realizations of Ut are not observable or identified,
one cannot directly condition on them to identify the functions GM |B and gM |B.
This precludes obtaining identification directly from (8). With the preceding results,
however, we can overcome this problem.
Observe that, like valuations and bids, the pivotal expected values w(sit;nt, xt, ut)
will have the separable structure






∣∣∣∣Sit = maxj 6=i Sjt = sit, Nt = nt
]
.
We will refer to w0(sit;nt) as bidder i’s “homogenized pivotal expected value” at











21See, e.g., Athey and Haile (2007) for a derivation in the affiliated values model.
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where





∣∣∣∣B0it = b,Nt = n)
and gM0|B0(m|b, nt) is the associated conditional density.
With the following regularity condition, Theorem 2 and a standard deconvolution
argument will yield identification of the joint distribution of (B01t, . . . , B
0
nt) for all n.
Assumption 11. For some x ∈ X the random variable γ (x, Ut) has nonzero charac-
teristic function almost everywhere.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1–11, conditional on any Nt = n, the joint density
of (B01t, . . . , B
0
nt) is identified.
Proof. Fix Nt = n and Xt = x, where x is as in Assumption 11. Let B̃it = ln (Bit)
and B̃0it = ln (B
0
it). By Assumption 3,
B̃it = B̃
0
it + γ (x, Ut) ,
and, furthermore, B̃0it and γ (x, Ut) are independent conditional on Nt. Let ψB̃ denote
the characteristic function of the log bids (B̃1t, . . . , B̃nt) conditional on Xt = x and
Nt = n. Let ψγ denote the characteristic function of γ (x, Ut) conditional on Nt = n.
For (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn we then have
ψB̃ (r1, . . . , rn) = ψB̃0 (r1, . . . , rn)ψγ (r1 + · · ·+ rn) ,
where ψB̃0 is the characteristic function of the log homogenized bids
(




conditional on Nt = n. Since the distribution of Ut|(Xt, Nt) is known (Corollary 1)
and γ is a known function (Theorem 2), ψγ is known. So under Assumption 11 the
equation
ψB̃0 (r1, . . . , rn) =
ψB̃ (r1, . . . , rn)
ψγ (r1 + · · ·+ rn)
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uniquely determines ψB̃0 (r1, . . . , rn) for almost all (r1, . . . , rn). By continuity of char-
acteristic functions this yields identification of ψB̃0 , implying identification of the joint
density of
(




.22 The result then follows. 
This leads directly to our main identification result.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1–11 hold. Then for all x ∈ X, u ∈ [0, 1], and n ≥ 2 in
the support of Nt|{Xt = x}, the joint distribution of (w(S1t;n, x, u), . . . , w(Snt;n, x, u))
is identified.
Proof. Fix n. From (10), we have
w0(Sit;n) = ξ(B
0








By Lemma 5, the joint distribution (ξ(B01t;n), . . . , ξ(B
0
nt;n)) is known. This implies
identification of the joint distribution of (w0(S1t;n), . . . , w
0(Snt;n)). The result then
follows immediately from (9) and Theorem 2. 
4 Estimation
We propose a two-stage semiparametric estimation strategy. The first stage in-
volves semiparametric sieve quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) of the
entry thresholds τ`(x, z), the index function γ, and the joint distributions of homoge-
nized equilibrium bids. In the second stage, for each level of bidder entry, we estimate
the joint distribution of homogenized pivotal expected values by plugging draws from
the estimated distribution of homogenized bids into the auction first-order condition
and constructing the empirical distribution of the resulting pseudo-sample.
22Because the same argument holds at all x ∈ X such that the characteristic function of γ (x, Ut)
is nonvanishing a.s., the argument demonstrating Lemma 5 may often yield overidentification.
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4.1 Stage 1: Sieve-QMLE
Let θτ denote the parameters of the entry model, θγ the parameters of the index
function γ, and θB the parameters of the joint distributions of log homogenized bids.
Let
L1t(nt; θτ ) = Pr(Nt = nt|Xt = xt, Zt = zt; θτ )
denote the (conditional on (xt, zt)) likelihood for the entry outcome in auction t. Let
L2t(bt|nt; θγ, θB, θτ )
denote the likelihood of the observed bids at auction t, conditional on the entry out-
come nt (and on (xt, zt)). Defining θ = (θτ , θγ, θB), the conditional quasi-likelihood
23




L1t(nt; θτ )L2t(bt|nt; θγ, θB, θτ ).
We give details of our empirical specification and the two components of the quasi-
likelihood in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 below. Estimates of the parameter vector θ can
be obtained by maximizing L(θ). Because θτ is identified from the entry outcomes
alone, it is also possible to split the QMLE stage, first maximizing
∏
t L1t(θτ ) to
estimate θτ , then maximizing
∏
t L2t(θγ, θB, θ̂τ ) conditional on θ̂τ . In our data, the
two approaches yield very similar estimates. However, because we found the two-step
QMLE procedure to be more stable numerically, below we will report results using
the two-step version of the QMLE.24
Consistency can be confirmed by adapting the results of White and Wooldridge
23Recall that we permit spatial dependence.
24With one-step QMLE, standard optimizers failed to find a maximum in many of the bootstrap
replications. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the two-step procedure performs well at moderate
sample sizes.
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(1991) for sieve-extremum estimators with weakly dependent time series data to the
case of weak spatial dependence.25 To conduct inference, we use a nonparamet-
ric block bootstrap procedure that captures both dependence among bids within
an auction and spatial dependence between the unobservables Ut across auctions.
Specifically, we resample auctions with replacement, taking all bids from the selected
auction, and including in the bootstrap sample all auctions on neighbor tracts as well.
Following HPP, we resample weighting auctions by factors inversely proportional to
the number of auctions in the neighborhood of the tract.26
4.1.1 Entry Thresholds
Our entry model above reduces to an ordered response model where, given Xt = x
and Zt = z, we have Nt = n if and only if Ut ∈ (τn−1 (x, z) , τn (x, z)). Given any
strictly increasing univariate CDF H we can rewrite this as
{Nt = n|Xt = x, Zt = z} ⇐⇒ {At ∈ (αn−1 (x, z) , αn (x, z))} ,
where At ∼ H and αn(x, z) = H−1 (τn (x, z)).
We specify a linear threshold function
αn(x, z) = αn − xαx − zαz
25In particular, we represent tract locations by points in Z2. Then, under a standard “expanding
domain” asymptotics, White and Wooldridge’s uniform consistency result for stationary α-mixing
time series data (Corollary 2.6) can be extended using a Bernstein-type inequality for α-mixing
random fields on Z2 (e.g., Yao (2003)).
26Similar results are obtained without weighting. Applying the results of van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996) and Lahiri (2003), one can verify validity of this procedure when we interpret our finite-sample
estimator as that for a parametric model. General conditions for consistency of bootstrap inference
procedures for sieve M-estimators in the i.i.d. setting can be found, e.g., in Ma and Kosorok (2005)
and Chen and Pouzo (2009). See also Chen and Liao (2014), and Chen, Liao, and Sun (2014) in the
case of time series data.
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and specify H as the standard normal CDF, yielding an ordered probit model.27
In section 7 we consider a variation in which H is specified using a Hermite poly-
nomial series approximation, following Gallant and Nychka (1987). Letting θτ =
({αn}n−1n=n, αx, αz), we then have
L1t(n; θτ ) = H (αn (xt, zt; θτ ) ; θτ )−H (αn−1 (xt, zt; θτ ) ; θτ ) .
4.1.2 Index Function and Homogenized Bid Distribution
Given our focus on testing for common values, we prioritize flexibility in how the joint
distribution and density of bids can vary with n when specifying the second part of
the quasi-likelihood. We specify the index function γ parametrically as γ(·, ·; θγ); we
will use a linear specification below. The joint density of log homogenized bids is
specified semiparametrically, using a parametric copula and a nonparametric (Bern-
stein polynomial sieve) specification of the common marginal distribution.28 Below
we specify a Gaussian copula, with separate covariance parameter ρn for each n.
29
We specify the marginal density of a generic bidder’s log homogenized bid in an
n-bidder auction as
g̃B0i (b̃
















27Thus, although the theoretical model of entry in Example 1 follows Berry (1992), the induced
empirical model of the entry stage is similar to that of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).
28See, e.g., Chen, Fan, and Tsyrennikov (2006). Prior work using Bernstein polynomials in esti-
mation of auction models includes Komarova (2017) and Kong (2017a,b). Hubbard, Paarsch, and
Li (2012) have previously combined a parametric copula and nonparametric (kernel) specification of
marginal densities to estimate auction models.
29Our use of a parametric copula reflects in part our choice to let the distribution of bids be fully
flexible (i.e., even in finite sample) with respect to the number of bidders nt. In other applications
one might specify a Bernstein copula and account for the effects of nt within the sieve approximation.
As we discuss in Appendix E, the Gaussian copula provides a substantial computational advantage
when we transform our estimated joint distributions and densities to the conditional distributions







νj (1− ν)m−j and Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the standard normal
distribution and density functions, respectively. Here m is a parameter, growing with
the sample size, that determines the order of the Bernstein polynomial approximation.
Let θb,n = {θ(j)b,n}mj=0. Thus, the parameter vector θb in (12) represents {θb,n}nn=n.
Because Bernstein polynomials approximate functions with domain [0, 1], in (12)
we use Bernstein polynomials to approximate the marginal density of the transformed
variable Φ(b̃0).30 This transformation is useful not only for standardizing the domain
but also for ensuring that the nonparametric estimator will offer sensible approxima-
tions even in modest sample sizes. When m = 0, for example, the distribution of
log-bids will be normal. Thus, the nonparametric component of our specification is
based on a sequence of approximating models that starts with a natural (lognormal)
parametric specification and adds flexibility as permitted by the sample size.
Let G̃B0i (b̃
0; θb, n) denote the CDF associated with g̃B0i (b̃
0; θb, n). Let χ(·; ρn) de-
note the symmetric Gaussian copula density with covariance parameter ρn.
31 We
specify the joint density of the log homogenized bids in n-bidder auctions as
g̃B0
(
b̃01, . . . , b̃
0







1; θb,n, n), . . . , G̃B0i (b̃
0




1; θb,n, n) . . . g̃B0i (b̃
0
n; θb,n, n). (13)
30For estimation purposes, we add intercepts γ0nt for each value of nt in the index function
γ(xt, ut; θγ), implying that in this step we actually estimate joint densities of centered log homoge-
nized bids b̃0t − γ0nt . We then adjust each estimated density with the appropriate intercept estimate
to obtain the density of (uncentered) log homogenized bids that is relevant to bidders’ first-order
conditions. When homogenization is performed via OLS, this type of centering procedure is required
for consistency (see HHS and Athey and Haile (2007)). In our case this is not essential but offers
several practical advantages by ensuring that the log homogenized bids are centered at zero prior
to transformation by the normal CDF, ensuring that the location of the estimated bid distribution
can move freely with nt (again, prioritizing flexibility with respect to nt), and freeing the Bernstein
coefficients to capture features of the marginal density other than its location.





′ (Υ−1 − I)ϕ(h)), where ϕ(h) = {Φ−1 (h1) , . . . ,Φ−1 (hn)} and the matrix
Υ has ones on the diagonal and covariance ρn in all off-diagonal entries.
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We discuss computational details in Appendix E.
Letting ρ = {ρn}nn=n and θB = (θb, ρ), we have
L2t(bt|nt; θ) =




b̃1t − γ(xt, u; θγ), . . . , b̃ntt − γ(xt, u; θγ); θb,nt , ρnt , nt
)
τnt(xt, zt; θτ )− τnt−1(xt, zt; θτ )
du,
(14)
where τnt−1(xt, zt; θτ ) and τnt(xt, zt; θτ ) denote the bounds on ut implied by the entry
model and its parameters θτ .
32 We approximate the integral above by Monte Carlo
simulation.
4.2 Stage 2: Invert Equilibrium First-Order Conditions
Given the first-stage estimates of the index function γ and joint distribution of ho-
mogenized bids, estimation of the relevant auction primitives is straightforward and
does not involve further use of the data. Here we use the equilibrium first-order con-















it|b̃0it, nt) and g̃M |B(b̃0it|b̃0it, nt) are, respectively, the CDF and pdf of
maxj 6=i B̃
0





For each value of Nt = n, we transform the estimated joint distributions and den-
sities obtained from stage 1 to construct the conditional distributions and densities
appearing (15) (see Appendix E). Then we draw log homogenized bids from their
estimated marginal distributions and plug these into (15), yielding pseudo-samples
32When nt = 1 one may set L2t(bt|nt; θ) = 1 by convention, since our baseline model of compet-
itive bidding does not allow us to interpret the quantity b̃it − γ(xt, ut) in that case. Alternatively,
because we specify different parameters θb,n for each value of n, (14) gives a correct expression for
L2t(bt|nt; θ) in a 1-bidder auction whenever bids in 1-bidder auctions are assumed to inherit the
separable structure required of valuations. Below we propose an extension incorporating a random
reserve price, where this separability is an implication of equilibrium behavior.
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of the vectors (w0(s1t;n), . . . , w
0(snt;n)) for many simulated auctions t. The em-
pirical distribution of these pseudo-draws provides a consistent estimate of the joint
distribution of homogenized pivotal expected values for n-bidder auction. Although
these joint distributions will suffice for our application, the pseudo-draws can also
be scaled by the estimated value of the index Γ(x, u) in order to estimated the joint
distributions of (non-homogenized) pivotal expected values given Xt = x and Ut = u.
In a private values setting, for example, this would yield an estimate of the joint
distribution of bidder valuations.
5 OCS Auctions
We apply our method to study auctions of oil and gas leases in the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). Our data cover the period 1954 to 1983. The seller in these
auctions was the Mineral Management Service (“MMS”), at that time an agency of
the U.S. Department of the Interior. Our goal is to examine these auctions through
the lens of our model to assess several fundamental features of the market such as
the market power of bidders, whether the data support the hypothesis of equilibrium
bidding, the effects of competition on bids and revenues, the significance of unobserved
heterogeneity and of correlation among bidders’ private information, and whether
there is empirical support for the presence of common values.
Features of the OCS auction setting arguably suggest common values (perhaps
even pure common values), and these auctions are often cited as examples of a com-
mon values setting. While prior empirical work on these auctions has provided sugges-
tive evidence in support of a common values model, Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)
have argued for formal testing, while HPP have pointed out that such testing has
been precluded by the likely presence of unobserved heterogeneity that affects both
expected lease value and the level of bidder participation.
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5.1 Background and Data
Extensive discussion of the OCS auctions can be found in, e.g., Gilley and Karels
(1981), Hendricks and Porter (1988), Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989), and HPP.
For a more complete institutional background, we refer readers to that prior work,
upon which we rely heavily ourselves. Briefly, however, auctions were held for the
right to lease a specified tract for exploration and production of oil, gas, and other
minerals. Tracts in the sample typically comprise a rectangular area (a “block”)
covering 5,000–5,760 acres in the Gulf of Mexico.33 Production on a tract was subject
to royalty payments from the leaseholder at a pre-specified rate, usually 1/6. Bids
at an auction were offers of an additional up-front “bonus” payment for the right to
become the leaseholder.
At a given “sale,” many tracts were offered for lease simultaneously through sepa-
rate first-price sealed bid auctions. No exploratory drilling was permitted prior to the
auction, although in some cases exploration and production would already have oc-
curred on adjacent (“neighbor”) tracts and would be publicly observable. Bids would
also reflect information obtained through evaluation of data from magnetic, gravity,
and seismic surveys.34 Although initial collection of survey data was often funded
jointly, firms relied on their own experts for modeling and analysis of the data, and
firms often performed follow-up surveys of the tracts on which they intended to bid.
Differences in expert assessments of the survey data are likely an important source of
heterogeneity in bidder beliefs about the value of a given tract (HPP). These features
lead us to treat bidder entry as a decision to acquire a costly signal about the value
33We limit attention to tracts of at least 4,000 acres. Smaller tracts are typically half-blocks or
quarter blocks, where several of our measures of neighborhood characteristics would have interpre-
tations different from those on standard tracts. We also drop auctions with missing values for our
covariates.
34See, e.g., “G&G Data Acquisition and Analysis” at https://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Resource-Evaluation/Geological-and-Geophysical-Data-Acquisition/GGData-
Geophysical-Surveys.aspx, March 24, 2018.
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of the tract (recall Example 1).
We have data on all auctions attracting at least one bidder.35 Table 1 shows
the number of auctions in our sample by number of bidders. We do not separate
wildcat, development, and drainage tracts; instead, we account directly for the pres-
ence of active neighbor leases and neighbor production, and allow for asymmetry
between neighbor vs. non-neighbor costs of signal acquisition in a way that general-
izes the structure considered in Hendricks and Porter (1988) (see Example 1).36 Like
Aradillas-Lopez, Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2017), we model bidders as symmetric
conditional on acquisition of a signal. Thus, while bidders may decide not to acquire
a signal through analysis of the seismic data and may reach different conclusions from
such analysis, the technology producing signals is modeled as symmetric across firms.
Table 1: Sample Sizes
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11–17
Tn 814 498 293 229 172 127 100 73 56 56 128
Tn denotes the number of auctions in our sample with n bidders.
The MMS sometimes announced a small minimum acceptable bid of $10–$25 per
acre; the MMS also retained the option to reject all bids when it deemed the auction
to be noncompetitive. Such rejections were rare in our sample except at auctions
attracting only one bid (see section 7.1). We initially treat both the announced
minimum bid and the MMS bid rejection policy as nonbinding, as in Li, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2000). However, we also consider a variation of the model in which the
35Appendix A demonstrates that with the model of entry and bidding given in Example 1, our
maintained assumptions remain valid in the presence of this sample selection.
36As a robustness check, we will also examine the subset of auctions that exclude drainage tracts.
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MMS bid rejection policy is modeled with a random secret reserve price, fit to the
data, that responds to tract characteristics and the number of bids received.
Typically a given tract will have eight neighbors, only some (or none) of which
will be “active” (under lease). Limited forms of joint bidding were permitted in
these auctions. Following the prior literature, we model each bid as coming from a
generic “bidder,” which might be solo firm or a bidding consortium.37 Our measure of
the number of neighbor firms (distinct owners of leases on neighbor tracts) accounts
for the presence of joint bidding by linking together firms that have bid together
previously in the same neighborhood, following the criteria developed by Aradillas-
Lopez, Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2017).
Our tract characteristics Xt, all measured as of the time of the auction, include the
number of active neighbor leases, whether the tract is isolated (no active neighbors),
the number of firms that bid for neighbor leases, whether the tract was offered previ-
ously (attracting no bidders or being relinquished by a prior leaseholder), whether a
lease has expired on a neighbor tract, the number of neighbor tracts previously drilled,
the number of “hits” on neighbor tracts, average water depth (and its square), and
the royalty rate associated with the lease. We present a summary of these auction
characteristics in Table 2. Below we will also incorporate year fixed effects.
Following Example 1, we consider one instrument for participation: the number
of neighbor firms.38 This variable is likely to affect bidder entry because ownership of
a neighbor tract is likely to reduce the cost of assessing the value of the current tract.
As discussed in Appendix A, when we condition on the number of neighbor tracts
and the set of firms that previously bid for those tracts, variation in the number of
neighbor firms is determined entirely by the realizations of bidder signals at prior
37Hendricks and Porter (1992) and Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2008) examine empirical and
theoretical aspects of joint bidding in these auctions.
38Note that when the number of neighbor firms is zero, the lease is defined as “isolated.” The
impact of isolation is captured directly through the dummy variable for isolation.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Dev
# active neighbor leases 1.48 0.00 1.96
isolated tract 0.59 1.00 0.49
# firms that bid for neighbors 2.37 0.00 3.56
re-offered tract 0.20 0.00 0.40
neighbor expired 0.31 0.00 0.46
# neighbors drilled 1.69 1.00 2.25
# neighbor hits 0.65 0.00 1.30
water depth 0.20 0.14 0.28
royalty rate 16.10 16.00 1.35
# neighbor firms 0.89 0.00 1.27
estimated ex-post value (millions 1982 dollars) -6.50 -6.69 46.38
auctions, and therefore independent of Ut under our maintained assumptions. Table
2 includes summary statistics for this instrument as well as for an estimate of the
realized value of each tract (see, e.g., HPP for details). We do not use these estimated
“ex post values” in our analysis, but the table demonstrates the substantial variation
in ultimate value of a lease, even among those attracting at least one bid.
5.2 Baseline Model Estimates
Here we report estimates of the entry model, index function, and joint distribution
of equilibrium bids, using our baseline empirical specification. We specify the entry
model as an ordered probit and use a linear index function γ. We estimate the joint
distributions of log homogenized bids using a Bernstein polynomial approximation
of order m = 4 and Gaussian copula.39 In general we estimate separate joint dis-
tributions for each value of nt. However, for large values of nt we observe relatively
few auctions (recall Table 1), leading us to use a specification in which all auctions
with nt ≥ 11 share the same marginal distribution of homogenized bids and the same
39Our choice of m reflects our experience with the tradeoff between flexibility an precision using
similar sample sizes in our Monte Carlo simulations.
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copula correlation parameter. Altogether, this leads to a baseline specification with
151 parameters to be estimated.
5.2.1 Entry Model
Table 3 shows our estimates of the entry model parameters. We also report both the
standard parametric standard error estimates (“SE”), which ignore spatial depen-
dence, and standard errors obtained from the spatial block bootstrap (“SE (BB)”).40
As discussed in section 2 (see also Appendix A), the function η characterizes the effect
of Zt on entry but generally will not reveal the (causal) effects of Xt. Thus one must
interpret the estimated coefficients here with caution. Nonetheless, these parameter
estimates, particularly those that are statistically distinguishable from zero, generally
have intuitive signs.41 The coefficient on Zt is positive (consistent with the predic-
tion of our motivating example) and statistically significant, supporting its value in
providing a source of variation in bidder entry.
5.2.2 Index Function and Bid Distribution
Table 4 displays estimates of the index parameters γx and γu, along with their es-
timated standard errors. The estimates indicate a strong effect of the unobserved
heterogeneity on bids. Because Ut is normalized to have a uniform distribution, the
coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in Ut drives up bids (and
valuations) by roughly 33%. We again caution that the estimated coefficients on Xt
do not have the usual causal interpretations. Nonetheless, the statistically significant
coefficients on Xt generally have intuitive signs.
We will not report estimates of the Bernstein polynomial parameters. However,
40We report results based on 800 bootstrap replications throughout.
41Note that, holding the number of neighbor firms fixed, a larger number of active neighbor leases
is associated with lower participation in auctions of neighboring tracts and may therefore indicate a
less desirable neighborhood.
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Table 3: Entry Model Estimates
Est. SE SE (BB)
# active leases X -0.089 0.028 0.033
isolated lease 0.518 0.089 0.100
# firms that bid for neighbors 0.016 0.011 0.012
reoffered tract -0.201 0.065 0.075
neighbor expired -0.044 0.070 0.079
# neighbors drilled -0.046 0.028 0.030
# neighbor hits 0.076 0.028 0.027
depth -0.558 0.179 0.283
depth squared 0.120 0.068 0.132
royalty rate -0.002 0.017 0.022
time controls Sale year dummies
# neighbor firms Z 0.1743 0.0414 0.0446
Table 5 shows our estimates of the Gaussian copula correlation parameters ρn. The
point estimates are positive, consistent with our assumption of positive dependence
between bidders’ private information. Although the point estimates generally suggest
greater correlation at higher levels of competition, a Wald test fails to reject the
hypothesis of equal copula correlation for all values of n,42 A Wald test strongly rejects
(p-value < 0.001) the null that all ρn are zero. Because homogenized bids are strictly
increasing functions of signals, this implies rejection of the hypothesis of independent
bidder types. This finding is of some importance on its own. Common knowledge
unobservables and correlated private information are two distinct phenomena with
different implications for behavior and policy. Often only one of these two sources of
correlation between bids has been permitted in applications.
42While not statistically distinguishable from the others, the estimated correlation parameter for
the nine-bidder auctions stands out. A close examination of the data revealed no clear explanation
for this. We do not use auctions with more than seven bidders in our tests for common values below,
and results are similar when we omit auctions with nt > 7 from the estimation altogether.
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Table 4: Index Function Estimates
Est. SE SE (BB)
# active leases X 0.016 0.018 0.021
isolated lease 0.042 0.059 0.087
# firms that bid for neighbors 0.029 0.008 0.011
reoffered tract -0.167 0.047 0.067
neighbor expired -0.280 0.047 0.067
# neighbors drilled 0.049 0.019 0.024
# neighbor hits -0.022 0.020 0.025
depth -0.224 0.135 0.269
depth squared 0.092 0.064 0.118
royalty rate -0.006 0.010 0.017
time controls Sale year dummies
unobserved heterogeneity U 1.136 0.273 0.351
Table 5: Copula Correlation Estimates
n Est. SE SE (BB)
2 0.044 0.041 0.050
3 0.031 0.029 0.040
4 0.089 0.031 0.032
5 0.136 0.030 0.041
6 0.112 0.035 0.037
7 0.111 0.044 0.043
8 0.133 0.039 0.040
9 0.295 0.071 0.067
10 0.161 0.052 0.068
11- 18 0.109 0.025 0.020
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5.3 Decomposition of Correlation and Variance
Correlation in private information is just one reason bids are correlated within an
auction; auction observables and unobservables also play a role. These auction char-
acteristics also contribute to the overall variance of the equilibrium bids. We can use
the results above to describe the contributions of each factor.
Table 6 shows a decomposition of within-auction pairwise correlation and overall
variance of the log bids.43 The figures presented here reflect calculations using simu-
lated draws from the estimated model. Figures in the first column, labeled “logB0it,”
are for the homogenized log bids. Here the pairwise correlation reflects the correla-
tion among signals, the nonlinearity of the bidding strategy (and log transformation),
and the fact that, all else equal, bid levels vary with the number of competitors in
the auction. Similarly, the variance in this column reflects the variability in bidders’
assessments of tract values, as well as variation in bidding strategies across auctions
with different numbers of entrants.
A natural way to characterize the contributions of unobservables is to examine the
correlation and variance arising from variation in γ(x, Ut) at a representative value
of x. With our linear specification of γ(Xt, Ut), this variation is identical for all x.
Thus, in the second column, labeled “logB0it + γuUt,” we add the contribution of
auction-level unobservables.
Quantifying the contribution of the observables Xt can be more problematic, at
least when we allow our model to represent an environment in which the underlying
unobservables may be correlated with Xt (see Appendix A). In that case, variation
with Xt in the conditional mean EUt [γ(Xt, Ut)|Xt] or in the uth quantile γ(Xt, u)
would correctly describe variation in bids associated with variation in Xt, but need
not represent the variation caused by variation in Xt alone—i.e., that arising when
43By “within-auction pairwise correlation” we refer to the Pearson correlation coefficient for pairs
of bids within the same auction.
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Table 6: Decomposition of Log Bid Correlation and Variance
logB0it logB
0
it + γuUt logB
0




0.133 0.210 0.222 0.425
Variance
1.520 1.669 1.693 2.292
the actual unobservables (Et in Example 1) are held fixed. However, once we know
the contributions of the log homogenized bids and the unobservables, we know that
all remaining correlation/variance in the log bids arises from the auction observables.
Again exploiting our linear specification of the index function, we split the contribu-
tions of observables into those of the year fixed effects and those of the auction-level
covariates. The third column of the table, labeled “logB0it + γuUt + X
′
tγx,” adds the
variation due to auction-level covariates, while the final column, labeled “logBit,”
adds the contribution of the year fixed effects to yield the total correlation and vari-
ance of the equilibrium bids.44
Given the wide time span of our data set and the substantial variation across
time in underlying market conditions, it is not surprising that the fixed effects ac-
count for a substantial portion of the correlation and variance. More interesting is a
comparison of the contributions of the auction-level covariates and the auction-level
unobservables. The the estimated contribution of the unobservables is roughly six
times as large as that of the observed covariates. This is particularly noteworthy
44Unlike the rest of the decomposition, the order of these last two steps could matter, due to
correlation between the covariates and fixed effects. Here, reversing the order has virtually no effect
on the implied contributions to the within-auction correlation; however it increases the contribution
of the covariates to the bid variance: the impact of unobservables is then only three (rather than
six) times as large as that of the observed covariates.
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because we selected covariates Xt from an unusually rich set of observables based in
part on explanatory power in descriptive analysis of bids. Unobserved heterogeneity
could be even more important in applications where only a limited set of covariates
is available.
6 Test For Common Values
6.1 Testing Approach
Using the estimates above, we test the null hypothesis of private values against the
alternative of common values, relying on the following additional assumption.
Assumption 12. For all n = 2, . . . , n− 1,
FS,V 0(S1t, . . . , Snt, V
0
1t, . . . , V
0
nt|Nt = n) = FS,V 0(S1t, . . . , Snt, V 01t, . . . , V 0nt|Nt = n+ 1).
This is an assumption that Ut is the only source of dependence between the num-
ber of bidders at auction t and their valuations/signals. Thus, for example, holding
(Xt, Ut) fixed, variation in Nt is not associated with variation in the valuations or
in the precision of signals. Given this condition, HHS showed that the homogenized
pivotal expected values w0(Sit;n) are unaffected by n in a private values auction but
decreasing in n in a common values auction.45 This distinction reflects the winner’s
curse, which is present in (and only in) common values auctions, and which becomes
more severe as the number of competitors increases (all else equal).46 HHS also
pointed out that under the maintained assumptions of the affiliated values auction
model, w0(Sit;n) must be weakly decreasing in n. Because violations of this require-
ment indicate a rejection of at least one of our maintained hypotheses, this allows a
45See also Athey and Haile (2002).
46We use the term “winner’s curse” to describe the adverse selection faced by a bidder competing
against others with informative signals, not to errors or regret on the part of a bidder.
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test of the maintained assumptions, including that of equilibrium bidding.47
To perform the tests, we first construct estimates of the marginal distributions
Fw(·;n) of homogenized pivotal expected values conditional on Nt = n, following the
procedure discussed in section 4. We then subject the estimated distributions to tests
of the null hypothesis of equality (private values),
Fw(w;n) = Fw(w;n+ 1) ∀w, n = 2, . . . , 6,
against the one-sided alterative of first-order stochastic dominance (common values),
Fw(w;n) ≤ Fw(w;n+ 1) ∀w, n = 2, . . . , 6,
with the inequality strict for at least some n and w. We limit attention to auctions
with at most seven bidders in part to ensure that we have a sample of at least 100
auctions for each value of n considered.48 An additional reason, however, is that
growth in the severity of the winner’s curse with the level of competition tends to
diminish quickly as n grows. Intuitively, once a bidder assumes that n − 1 others
have low signals, learning that one additional signal is low conveys little “bad news”
unless n is small. Thus, with common values, pivotal expected values are decreasing
and, typically, convex in n.49 This intuitive feature leads us to expect any evidence
for common values to be clearest when comparing distributions at the lowest values
n to those at higher levels of n.
47Another testable implication of the maintained hypotheses is that the inverse homogenized
bid functions—i.e., the right-hand-side of the first order conditions (15)—be strictly increasing as
functions of the log homogenized bid (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)). We find no violation
of this requirement, even before allowing for sampling error (see Figure 2 below.)
48Abusing notation slightly, we let n (without an index) represent the number of bidders in a
non-specific auction rather than referring repeatedly to “the number of bidders.”
49This convexity holds in all examples of symmetric common values auctions we are aware of. An
interesting open question is whether additional assumptions are needed to prove this as a general
property.
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where [y]+ = y × 1{y > 0} and F̂w(w;N) is the estimated distribution of w0(Sit;Nt)
conditional on Nt lying in a range of values defined by a set N. We focus primarily on
sets N containing two adjacent values of n (“coarse binning”). This pooling is done to
reduce the impact of sampling error. However, by combining n = 2 and n = 3, where
we expect the largest change in the severity of the winner’s curse, this pooling may
hide the strongest evidence of common values. Thus, we will also consider singleton
sets (“fine binning”). In addition to pairwise tests, we will construct a single test
statistic for the full range n = 2, . . . , 7, based on the maximum statistic (or smoothed










Below we report results for the pairwise and “max” tests for coarse binning, as well
as the for the max test for fine binning.50 We construct p-values for the test statistics
using the distribution of (re-centered) test statistics from the spatial block bootstrap
procedure described above.
6.2 Testing Results
In Figure 1a we show the estimated CDFs under coarse binning, where we compare
“low”(n ∈ {2, 3}), “medium” ((n ∈ {4, 5}), and “high” (n ∈ {6, 7}) levels of compe-
50Appendix D provides the complete test results for the fine binning, including those for the
alternative specifications below. In general, these results confirm that, while the fine binning tests
are noisier, the strongest evidence for common values comes from comparisons of n = 2 to n = 3,
where we have relatively large numbers of bidders and where we consistently obtain p-values smaller
than those for the max test reported in the text.
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tition. Under the null, these distributions should differ only due to sampling error,
whereas the alternative of common values implies that the CDFs will shift “north-
west” as n increases. The estimated distributions shown here exhibit the stochastic
ordering implied by the common values model. Further, as expected, the gap between
the distributions for low and medium n is substantially larger than that between the
distributions for medium and high n. We contrast this with Figure 1b, which shows
the estimated distributions obtained when we estimate the model without allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity. Here the results suggest stochastic ordering in the direction
opposite that predicted by common values. This suggests a misspecified model.
Table 7 shows the p-values obtained from the formal tests. These results confirm
what was suggested by the figures above. First consider the comparison between low
n and medium n when we allow unobserved heterogeneity (“With UH”). The test for
common values implies rejection of private values in favor of common values, with
a p-value of 0.021. The smaller gap between the estimated CDFs for medium and
high n observed in Figure 1 cannot be statistically distinguished. However, the max
tests—for both coarse and fine binning—also imply rejection at significance levels
around 2 percent. Consistent with Figure 1, the specification test yields no evidence
suggesting misspecification in the model with unobserved heterogeneity.
Contrast these results with those obtained in the model without unobserved het-
erogeneity (“No UH”). Here, the conclusions are essentially reversed. Not only is there
no evidence of common values, but the specification tests suggest misspecification,
with all three coarse binning tests yielding p-values below 0.10. Thus, at least in our
data, failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity prevents detection of common
values and can erroneously suggest non-equilibrium bidding. This is intuitive, but not
a necessary implication of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity. On one hand, when we
ignore unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry, an “endogenous treatment”
bias works against the winner’s curse effect we are seeking to detect: auctions with
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Figure 1: Test for Common Values, Baseline Specification
(a) With Unobserved Heterogeneity
(b) Without Unobserved Heterogeneity
38
Table 7: Test p-values
Baseline Specification
Test for Common Values
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.021 0.299
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.274 0.754
Max (coarse binning) 0.022 0.590
Max (fine binning) 0.019 0.541
Specification Test
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.906 0.066
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.901 0.076
Max (coarse binning) 0.985 0.081
Max (fine binning) 0.922 0.239
more bidders may have a larger winner’s curse, but they also have more favorable
unobservables. So the true effects of n on pivotal expected values could be masked
or even reversed. But this intuition is incomplete. The model is misspecified when
unobserved heterogeneity is present but ignored in the first-order conditions used to
interpret the data. The cumulative distributions recovered in that case are not those
of bidders’ pivotal expected values. Moreover, the direction of the misspecification
bias is unclear, and this bias may vary with n. Nonetheless, the results indicate that
ignoring unobserved heterogeneity obscures the presence of common values in our
sample.
6.3 Competition, Market Power, and Revenue
The presence of affiliation and common values can have important implications for
auction design (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982)). For example, this supports
the use of royalty payments but suggests that, absent concerns about susceptibil-
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ity to collusion (e.g., Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011)), an ascending auction could
produce more revenue. Affiliation and common values also interact with the usual
effects of competition. A well known feature of common value auctions is that added
bidder competition can lead, counterintuively, to less aggressive bidding, and even
to reduced seller revenue.51 The winner’s curse is a key force behind this possibility,
although Pinkse and Tan (2005) demonstrated that bids can decline in the level of
competition due to affiliation of signals alone. Here we use our estimates to examine
the equilibrium effects of bidder competition on bid shading, the level of bids, and
seller revenue.
In Figure 2 we plot, for different values of n, bidders’ homogenized pivotal expected
values against the associated homogenized bids implied by the first-order condition
(10). Recall that pivotal expected values are strictly increasing in bidder types (sig-
nals). We know from theory that all types above the lowest possible type shade their
bids below their pivotal expected values, and that the degree of bid shading is in-
creasing in type. Here we see that the estimated magnitude of this bid shading is
substantial—all curves lie well below the 45 degree line. However, the gap shrinks as
the level of competition rises from n = 2 to n = 7.
In Figure 3 we plot the estimated homogenized equilibrium bidding strategies
β0(·;n), where we normalize bidder signals to lie on [0, 1] without loss. These es-
timated bid functions are strictly increasing as implied by the model (but not im-
posed). They are also generally increasing with n, although this monotonicity reverses
at n = 7. Such a reversal is consistent with the folk wisdom that equilibrium bids
“eventually” decrease in the number of competitors in a common values auction (see,
e.g., Laffont (1997)). However, to assess whether this reflects more than sampling er-
ror, we subject these bid functions to the same type of tests we applied to the pivotal
51Laffont (1997) reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on this point. See also Hong and
Shum (2002).
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Figure 2: Competition and Bid Shading
Estimated pivotal expected values on horizontal axis with the associated
equilibrium bids on the vertical axis, both in 1982 dollars.
Figure 3: Competition and Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
Bidder signals (normalized to [0, 1] on the horizontal axis with the associ-
ated equilibrium bids (in 1982 dollars) on the vertical axis.
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expected values to test for common values above. Here we test the null hypothesis
that the bidding strategies β0(·;n) are increasing in n. The test comparing n = 6 to
n = 7 yields the smallest p-value, which is 0.162. Thus, we are unable to reject the
null at standard significance levels.
Finally, Table 8 shows, at each value of n, the implications of our estimates for
a seller’s expected revenue and median revenue at a homogenized auction (where Xt
and Ut are set to zero). Both measures of revenue increase monotonically with the
number of bidders. Notably, even though our point estimates (Figure 3) suggested
non-monotonicity with respect to n, this effect is overcome by the fact that the
winning bid is the maximum among n bids. Thus, even our point estimates give no
indication that a seller would profit from restricting entry to reduce the severity of
the winner’s curse faced by bidders.
Table 8: Competition and Revenues








Revenue in millions of 1982 dollars, for a
hypothetical auction with γ(xt, ut) = 0.
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7 Alternative Specifications
Here we consider several alternative specifications, focusing on the tests for common
values and specification tests.
7.1 Random Reserve Price
Our baseline model ignores the fact that the MMS retained (and sometimes exer-
cised) a right to reject all bids. A bidder who anticipates this rejection possibility
would have an incentive for more aggressive bidding than is implied by the standard
equilibrium first-order condition. In our sample this effect is likely to be small in
auctions attracting at least three bidders, where well over 99 percent of all winning
bids were accepted.52 However, the threat of rejection could be an important factor
in auctions attracting only one or two bidders.53
To incorporate this feature, we follow Hendricks, Porter, and Spady (1989) and
Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994)) by modeling bid rejection with a random
reserve price whose value is unknown to bidders. From a bidder’s perspective, the
random reserve price is effectively an additional bid (submitted by the auctioneer),
leading to a first-order condition similar to that in the baseline case. We follow Bajari
and Hortaçsu (2003) by modeling the reserve price as drawn from the same marginal
distribution as a bid, although we rescale the seller’s “bid” to fit the observed MMS
rejection decisions. We give additional detail and discussion in Appendix C.
Figures 4a and 4b show the estimated marginal distributions of pivotal expected
values obtained with this alternative model. These are very similar to the estimates
52Rejection of the high bid occurred more often at auctions dropped from our sample due either
to missing values or to their being auctions of leases on partial-block tracts.
53Accounting for this threat enables us to rationalize observed bids in one-bidder auctions as
interior solutions obeying a first-order condition and inheriting the index structure of the valuations.
Therefore, given the large number of one-bidder auctions in our sample, we include one-bidder
auctions in the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters for all specifications.
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obtained in the baseline model. In Figure 4a, where we allow unobserved hetero-
geneity, we see the pattern of first-order stochastic dominance predicted by common
values, with the magnitude of the estimated shifts in the distributions declining with
n. Figure 4b again shows that, if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored, we obtain
estimated distributions ordered in the direction opposite that implied by common
values. As shown in Table 9, the formal tests are also very similar to those in the
baseline case.54 In particular, when we account for unobserved heterogeneity, the
test for common values leads us to reject private values, with p-values between 0.02
and 0.03. However, we se no evidence of common values when we ignore unobserved
heterogeneity.
Table 9: Test p-values
Random Reserve Specification
Test for Common Values
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.023 0.306
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.278 0.759
Max (coarse binning) 0.027 0.605
Max (fine binning) 0.028 0.664
Specification Test∗
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.847 0.036
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.839 0.071
Max (coarse binning) 0.960 0.075
Max (fine binning) 0.910 0.245
∗ See footnote 54 and Appendix C.
54As discussed in Appendix C, with the random reserve price, violations of weak stochastic ordering
need not imply rejection of the model. Thus, although the table shows the results of the specification
tests, these do not have the usual interpretation.
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7.2 Semi-nonparametric Entry Model
In the results presented so far, the entry model was estimated as an ordered probit:
in the notation of section 4.1.1, the distribution H(·) was specified as the standard
normal. Although H could be chosen arbitrarily if we specified each αn(x, z) nonpara-
metrically, with our parametric specification of the thresholds αn(x, z) the choice of H
could matter. Thus, we consider here an alternative semi-nonparametric specification
in which H(·) is approximated flexibly with Hermite polynomials.










where K̃ is the order of the Hermite polynomial approximation, σk are parameters,







φ(ε)dε. We set K̃ = 3.
Because the entry model affects only the way that we control for unobserved
heterogeneity, we examine here only the results obtained from the model allowing
unobserved heterogeneity. In Figure 5 we plot the estimated distributions of homog-
enized pivotal expected values obtained when we use this alternative specification of
the entry model. These distributions exhibit patterns very similar to those from the
baseline model. Table 10 confirms that the formal test results are also very simi-
lar. Indeed, the statistical evidence of common values is slightly stronger (smaller
p-values) with this more flexible specification.
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Figure 5: SNP Entry Model
With UH
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Table 10: Test p-values
With SNP Entry Model
Test for Common Values
With UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.014
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.198
Max (coarse binning) 0.015
Max (fine binning) 0.004
Specification Test
With UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.923
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.948
Max (coarse binning) 0.995
Max (fine binning) 0.933
7.3 No Year Fixed Effects
Our previous specifications included year fixed effects. These provide flexible control
for a number of common-knowledge time-varying factors such as macro shocks, vari-
ation in oil and gas prices, changes in industry structure, regulatory changes, etc.,
which vary substantially over the three decades of our sample. We saw the impor-
tance of this temporal variation in Table 6. However, in some applications one might
not have sufficient sample size to allow such flexibility. Without the fixed effects,
time varying factors would be an additional source of unmeasured heterogeneity, and
it is interesting to explore what happens in such cases. We therefore consider a
specification that drops the year fixed effects.
The estimated distributions of pivotal expected values are shown in Figures 6a and
6b. When we account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous entry we obtain
estimated distributions of pivotal expected values that are again ordered as we would
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expect under common values. The specification ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
yields estimated distributions that are ordered—now more sharply than in the baseline
specification—in the direction indicating misspecification of the model.
When we examine the formal test results in Table 11, the statistical evidence
aligns with the impression given by the figures. For the model allowing unobserved
heterogeneity, the rejections of private values in favor of common values are at slightly
larger significance levels than in the baseline specification, particularly in the case of
fine binning. However, the more striking difference is the stronger rejection of the
model that assumes no unobserved heterogeneity. This is as we would expect: as more
auction-level factors are forced into the unobservable, the misspecification implied by
ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be more severe.
Table 11: Test p-values
No Year Fixed Effects
Test for Common Values
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.024 0.406
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.319 0.841
Max (coarse binning) 0.028 0.748
Max (fine binning) 0.095 0.985
Specification Test
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.976 0.069
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.744 0.009
Max (coarse binning) 0.937 0.009
Max (fine binning) 0.942 0.625
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7.4 No Drainage Tracts
“Drainage” tracts are those adjacent to productive leases. It is natural to imagine
that owners of neighbor leases have an advantage in assessing the value of adjacent
tracts. The path-breaking paper of Hendricks and Porter (1988) focused on drainage
tracts and assumed that only the neighbor firm had access to a private signal of the
tract value, whereas non-neighbors relied solely on common knowledge information.
Our model of entry in OCS auctions (see Example 1) can be viewed as relaxing this
structure by allowing less extreme forms of asymmetries in signal acquisition costs
and permitting competition between multiple neighbors.55 However, our model is
one in which bidders choosing to acquire signals have private information of (ex ante)
equal precision: bidders are symmetric in the auction stage. This is consistent with
the fact that the frequency of winning conditional on bidding and on the number of
bidders is virtually identical for neighbors and non-neighbors in our sample. However,
if there is significant private information that can be obtained only by drilling, this
is something not permitted by our model. We therefore repeat the analysis dropping
all drainage tracts.
Unsurprisingly, restricting the sample in this way eliminates much of the variation
in our instrument. This is an important limitation. Recalling the discussion in section
3, it means that the results in this case will be more heavily reliant on the functional
form of the index function γ, and are likely to be less precisely estimated. The esti-
mated distributions in this case, shown in Figures 7a and 7b, are in fact very similar
to those obtained from the full sample. However, the formal test results show that
there is indeed a loss of precision. When we allow for unobserved heterogeneity, the
coarse binning test for common values comparing “low” and “medium” competition
55Hendricks and Porter (1988) assume that if there are multiple neighbors, only one submits
a serious bid. This leads to the result that non-neighbors bid in equilibrium despite having no
information, using mixed strategies. Such behavior is possible in equilibrium when there is no cost
of bidder entry.
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yields a p-value of 0.162, with a p-value of 0.168 for the max test. With fine binning,
the max test yields a p-value of 0.075. The fine binning comparison between n = 2
and n = 3, where we expect the largest effect of the winner’s curse, yields a p-value
of 0.030. Specification tests applied to the model ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
fail to reject at conventional significance levels, with p-values between 0.13 and 0.19
from the coarse binning tests.
Thus, while we can still reject private values in favor of common values (at the
10% level or 5% level using one of the fine binning tests), the statistical evidence is
less definitive. These results indicate that, while the patterns in the estimated distri-
butions obtained from the full sample are robust to exclusion of the drainage tracts,
the variation in the instrument these tracts provide is important for the precision of
the results.
Table 12: Test p-values
No-drainage Specification
Test for Common Values
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.162 0.344
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.485 0.651
Max (coarse binning) 0.168 0.463
Max (fine binning) 0.075 0.508
Specification Test
With UH No UH
{2,3} vs. {4,5} 0.856 0.188
{4,5} vs. {6,7} 0.742 0.134
Max (coarse binning) 0.863 0.149
Max (fine binning) 0.724 0.246
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We have proposed an empirical approach to first-price sealed bid auctions with af-
filiated values, unobserved auction-level heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry.
Although our approach offers several conceptual and practical advantages for our em-
pirical study of OCS auctions, it relies on several important assumptions that will
be more suitable in some applications than others. Further work may identify ways
to relax some of our assumptions or trade them for others. All econometric methods
allowing unobserved heterogeneity in first-price auctions require compromises, and in
practice the best approach will vary with the application and questions at hand.
Our analysis of the OCS auction data leads us to reject the private values model in
favor common values, a conclusion that is robust across a variety of specifications. We
found that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity can hide the presence of common values,
due in part to the fact that positive dependence between bidder entry and unobserved
tract value works against the effects that exogenous changes in the number of bidders
have on the severity of the winner’s curse. However, in practice our specification tests
allow us to reject specifications that ignore unobserved heterogeneity.
While our empirical results confirm the conventional wisdom that oil lease auctions
should be viewed as common values auctions, they also raise challenges. We obtained
a useful form of partial identification for a common values model, but common values
models—even without unobserved heterogeneity—generally are not point identified
without assumptions and data beyond what we required. Thus it will be important to
continue pursuit of approaches to identification that exploit the features of particular
settings (see, e.g., HPP or Somaini (2015)) and to explore extensions permitting
unobserved heterogeneity. It may also prove productive to pursue other forms of
partial identification that can be used to address positive and normative questions.
The recent work of Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2018) provides one such approach.
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Appendices
A Equilibrium Entry in a Model of OCS Auctions
Here we consider a particular extensive form game of entry and bidding that is mo-
tivated by our application and yields the reduced form (3) for the entry outcome
presented in the text, including the assumed weak monotonicity conditions.56 This
example also demonstrates how our model can accommodate auction-specific unob-
servables that are of arbitrary dimension and correlated with auction-specific observ-
ables, despite the apparent contradiction to our assumption that Ut is a scalar and
independent of Xt. Accommodation of such correlation requires that we allow the in-
terpretation of Ut to vary with the vector Xt. This precludes identification of (causal)
effects of covariates on the auction; but in typical auction applications auction-level
observables are primarily confounding factors to be controlled for rather than factors
whose effects are of direct interest themselves. This section also motivates the instru-
ment used in our application. Finally, we discuss here the selection on unobservables
that could be implied by considering only auctions attracting at least one bid, as
necessitated by our data. We demonstrate that such selection introduces only an
additional way in which the interpretation of Ut varies with Xt.
A.1 Model
Consider a game of entry and bidding for the lease of a tract t. Let I denote the
set of all potential bidders (“firms”), and let I = |I|. The set I can be partitioned
into the set Zt of “neighbor firms”—holders of active leases on adjacent (“neighbor”)
tracts—and all other firms, I\Zt. Denote the number of neighbor firms by Zt = |Zt|.
56Example 1 in the text provided a sketch.
55
Let Vit denote the value of the lease to firm i (i’s “valuation”). Let Xt and Et denote,
respectively, observed and unobserved (to us) characteristics of lease t that affect
bidders’ valuations. Let Xt include (among other relevant characteristics) the number
of active leases on neighboring tracts and the set of bidders for each of those leases.57
We make no restriction on the dimension of Et and do not require independence
between Xt and Et.
The game consists of two stages. In the second stage, lease t is offered by first-
price auction to the Nt bidders who enter in the first stage. We assume there is
no binding reserve price in the auction.58 In the first stage, bidders simultaneously
choose whether to incur an entry cost in order to acquire a signal and participate in
the auction.59 Let ci (xt) denote the entry cost for firm i. Neighbors have lower entry
costs. In particular, ci (xt) = c (xt) for a neighbor firm, whereas non-neighbor firms
have entry costs ci (xt) = c (xt) + δ (xt), with δ (xt) > 0.
Firms acquiring signals become “bidders” and learn the number of competitors
they face. Let Nt denote the number of bidders. Let Sit denote the signal received by
bidder i. Given Nt = n, let St = (S1t, . . . , Snt) and Vt = (V1t, . . . , Vnt, ) , where without
loss we re-label bidders as firms i = 1, . . . n. For any conditioning set Ω ⊆ (Xt, Zt, Et),
let FSV (St, Vt|Nt,Ω) denote the conditional distribution of bidders’ signals and valua-
tions. We assume FSV (St, Vt|Nt, Xt, Zt, Et) satisfies standard smoothness, symmetry,
affiliation, and nondegeneracy conditions (see Assumption 2 in the text). We assume
that Zt alters the joint distribution of signals and valuations only through its effect
57In practice we represent the set of bidders for neighboring tracts more parsimoniously with the
number of such bidders.
58In our application we consider an extension allowing a random reserve price.
59As is standard in the literature, we assume that only bidders incurring the entry cost can submit
a bid (see, e.g., Levin and Smith (1994), Li and Zheng (2009), Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011),
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Gentry and Li (2014), or Bhattacharya, Roberts, and Sweeting
(2014)). This assumption can be relaxed, allowing bidding with no signal, under an equilibrium
selection rule specifying that firms indifferent to entry do not enter.
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on Nt, i.e.,
FSV (St, Vt|Nt, Zt, Xt, Et) = FSV (St, Vt|Nt, Xt, Et) ,
and that Zt is independent of Et conditional on Xt. We discuss the justification




it λ (Xt, Et) , (A.1)
where the function λ is bounded and the random variables
(
V 01t, . . . , V
0
ntt, S1t, . . . , Sntt
)
are independent of (Xt, Et, Zt) conditional on Nt. We assume that λ(x,Et) is contin-
uously distributed for all x ∈ X.60
Note that we have not restricted the dimension of Et, imposed any monotonicity
condition on λ, or required independence between Xt and Et.
61 Nonetheless, we can
obtain the model of unobserved heterogeneity in the text by representing the random
variable λ(Xt, Et) in terms of its quantiles conditional on Xt. In particular, given
Xt = x, let Fλ (·|x) denote the CDF of the random variable λ (x,Et), and let
Ut = Fλ (λ(x,Et)|x) . (A.2)
For u ∈ [0, 1] define F−1λ (u|x) = inf {λ : Fλ (λ|x) ≥ u} and let
Γ (x, u) = F−1λ (u|x) . (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), for each x we have Fλ(Γ(x, Ut)|x) = Ut = Fλ(λ(x,Et)|x),
60This assumption can be dropped, for example, by assuming instead that any indifferences in the
entry stage are broken the same way conditional on observables.
61This may be important, as the nomination process by which tracts were offered for lease in our
sample period suggests that a tract with “undesirable” value of Xt may have been unlikely to be
offered unless the value of Et made the tract desirable. See, e.g., Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau
(1987) for a discussion of the nomination process.
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i.e.,
Γ(x, Ut) = λ(x,Et).
By construction, Γ is weakly increasing in its second argument, and Ut is uniform on
[0, 1] conditional on Xt. And because Ut is a measurable function of Et conditional
on Xt, Ut is independent of Zt conditional on Xt.
Note that in this new representation of the model, the distribution of Ut does not
vary with Xt, but its interpretation generally will. Observe that because Γ(xt, ut) =
λ(xt, et) for all t by construction, Γ(Xt, Ut) fully characterizes the variation and de-
pendence in valuations and bids that arises from the observables and unobservables.
Likewise, controlling for the value of Γ(Xt, Ut) fully controls for the effects of auction
observables and unobservables (Xt, Et) on valuations, bids, and equilibrium first-order
conditions. However, we will not be able to quantify the effect of a change in Xt (or
one of its components) holding unobservables fixed, since our Ut is redefined at every
value of Xt.
A.2 Equilibrium
We henceforth use the representation of the model just derived. The set of firms I, the
rules of the game, the values of (Xt, Ut, Zt), and the distribution FSV (St, Vt|Nt, Xt, Ut)
are common knowledge among firms. We consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
pure strategies, with weakly increasing strategies in the auction stage.
The second stage of the game is identical to the first-price sealed bid auction with
symmetric affiliated values studied by Milgrom and Weber (1982), who characterize
the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in increasing bidding strategies. Bidder i’s payoff
in the auction stage can be written as a function of the commonly known (Nt, Xt, Ut)
and the realized bidder signals St. As noted in the text, multiplicative separability
of valuations is inherited by equilibrium bids. This implies that a bidder’s ex post
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profit, denoted by π (Sit, S−it, Nt, Xt, Ut), is strictly increasing in the index Γ(Xt, Ut)
and, therefore, weakly increasing in Ut. Further, we assume the usual case in which
the ex ante expected equilibrium payoff
π̄ (Nt, Xt, Ut) = E [π (Sit, S−it, Nt, Xt, Ut) |Nt, Xt, Ut]
is strictly decreasing in Nt.
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In the entry stage, firms make decisions based on the cost of entry and expected
profit from participating in the auction. Let Cit = ci (Xt). For firm i, entering when
n− 1 other firms will also enter implies expected profit
π̄ (n,Xt, Ut)− Cit.
Conditional on (Xt, Zt, Ut), and given equilibrium beliefs about payoffs in the auction
stage, the entry stage is then equivalent to the entry game in Berry (1992). Berry
showed that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and that with probability one all
equilibria exhibit the same number of entrants, given by
nE (Xt, Zt, Ut) = max
0≤n≤I
{n : π̄ (n,Xt, Ut)− Cit ≥ 0} .
Recall that (Xt, Zt) determine the values of {Cit}i∈I .
Thus, in any pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with weakly increasing
bidding) we have
Nt = n
E (Xt, Zt, Ut) .
Further, because π̄ (Nt, Xt, Ut) is weakly increasing in Ut, so is the function n
E.
62We know of no counterexample to strict monotonicity in Nt under the assumption that Ut is
the only latent source of dependence between the entry and auction stages—i.e., that Assumption
12 holds. Nonmonotonicity (within the relevant range of Nt) could lead to existence of multiple
equilibria with different numbers of bidders.
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A.3 The Instrument
Our instrument for bidder entry Zt is the number of neighbor firms. First consider
the “exclusion” requirement (Assumption 5). We have assumed directly that Zt is in-
dependent of (St, V
0
t ) conditional on Nt, i.e., that Xt are the only observables directly
affecting bidder valuations.63 However we must verify that Zt is also independent
of Ut conditional on Xt. A tract with three neighbor leases, for example, may have
one, two, or three neighbor firms, depending on which bidders for the neighboring
leases won those auctions. Given the number of neighbor leases and the bidders for
each neighbor tract (i.e., conditional on Xt), the number of distinct winners reflects
only random variation in bidders’ signals at prior auctions. Recall that signals are as-
sumed independent of tract-specific unobserved heterogeneity and independent across
tracts. Thus, even in the case of spatially correlated tract-level unobservables Et, the
conditional independence requirement Zt |= Ut|Xt will hold.
Regarding the “relevance” requirement for the instrument Zt,
64 observe that
changes in the number of neighbor firms affects entry because for some combina-
tions of (Xt, Zt, Ut) the market will accommodate the n+1st entrant only if there is a
potential bidder with low signal acquisition cost. For example, we will sometimes have
two entrants because the market would support entry by a third (low cost) neighbor,
but not by a third firm that is a (high cost) non-neighbor. Thus, larger values of Zt
will lead, all else equal, to weakly larger numbers of entrants. If the cost asymmetry
is substantial, the effects of the instrument on entry will be substantial as well.
63This could fail here if the number of neighbor firms had a direct effect on tract value (given Xt),
e.g., by driving up costs of negotiating production from common pools.
64This discussion is informal. We have specific “relevance” requirements in the identification
results. Our instrument falls short of these by being discrete rather than continuous. As discussed in
the identification analysis, discrete instruments may lead to reliance on functional form to interpolate
between the points at which the index function γ (x, ·) is identified at each x.
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A.4 Truncation
In the OCS data we observe no information about (even existence of) leases offered
for sale but attracting no bids. Given the tract nomination process in place during
the sample period, this may not have been a frequent phenomenon. But existence
of such leases could imply a form of selection on unobservables: leases attracting no
bids would be those with relatively undesirable unobservables. Here we demonstrate
that such selection is accommodated by interpreting the unobservable in our model
as that conditioned on the event that the auction attracts at least one bid.
In our model, offered leases attracting no bids are those for which
π (1, xt, ut) ≤ cit ∀i ∈ I. (A.4)





ci (xt) ; 1, xt
)
,
or, more simply given our definition of ci(xt),
ut ≤ u (xt) .
Recalling that the definition of Ut already changes with each value of Xt, we obtain
the original model by redefining Ut to denote the value of the unobservable conditional
on truncation at u(Xt).
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65Note that the threshold for attracting a single bidder varies depending on the presence of at
least one neighbor tract (firm), but not with the number of neighbor firms Zt.
66More formally, going back to the original formulation of the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of
Et, let π̃ (Nt, Xt, Et) denote the expected second-stage payoff for a bidder facing Nt − 1 opponents
given (Xt, Et). Under the separable structure (A.1), we have π̃ (Nt, Xt.Et) = π̃
0 (Nt)λ (Xt, Et).
Given Xt = x, we have a zero-bidder auction when λ (x,Et) ≤ mini ci(xt)π̃0(1) . Thus, we modify the con-
struction of Ut by letting Fλ (·|x) denote the CDF of λ (x,Et) conditional on λ (x,Et) > mini ci(xt)π̃0(1) .
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B Proofs Omitted from the Text
Here we provide proofs omitted from the text. For convenience we restate the results
being proved.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1–6, the distribution of Ut|(Xt, Nt) is identified.
Proof.
We can express Pr (Ut ≤ u|Xt = x,Nt = n) as
FU |XN (u|x, n) =
∫
FU |XZN (u|x, z, n) dζ (z|x, n) (B.1)
where FU |XZN is the distribution of Ut|(Xt, Zt, Nt) and ζ is the distribution of Zt|(Xt, Nt).
Conditional on Nt = n, Zt = z, and Xt = x, Ut is uniform on [τn−1 (x, z) , τn (x, z)],
and by Theorem 1 the endpoints τn−1 (x, z) and τn (x, z) are identified. So FU |XZN
is known. Since ζ is directly observed, the result follows from (B.1). 
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1–8, for all n ≥ n, all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), and all (x′, z′) ∈
Y (n), γ (x, τn (x, z))− γ (x′, τn−1 (x′, z′)) is identified.
Proof. For n∗ as defined in Assumption 8, take n ≤ n∗ and let x (n), z (n), and ẑ (n)
be as in part (i) of Assumption 8 so that
n (x (n) , z (n)) = n
n (x (n) , ẑ (n)) = n+ 1.
(B.2)
Since (x (n) , z (n)) ∈ Y (n) and (x (n) , ẑ (n)) ∈ Y (n+ 1), Lemma 1 implies identifi-
cation of
γ (x′, τn−1 (x
′, z′))− γ (x (n) , τn−1 (x (n) , z (n))) (B.3)
and
γ (x′′, τn (x
′′, z′′))− γ (x (n) , τn (x (n) , ẑ (n))) (B.4)
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for all (x′, z′) ∈ Y (n) and (x′′, z′′) ∈ Y (n+ 1). By (4) and (B.2),
τn−1 (x (n) , z (n)) = 0 = τn (x (n) , ẑ (n)) ,
so subtracting (B.3) from (B.4) yields identification of
γ (x′′, τn (x
′′, z′′))− γ (x′, τn−1 (x′, z′)) (B.5)
for all (x′′, z′′) ∈ Y (n+ 1) and (x′, z′) ∈ Y (n). By Assumption 7, there exists some
(x′′, z′′) that is in both Y (n+ 1) and Y (n). The claim then follows from Lemma 1.
A symmetric argument applies for n > n∗.67 
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 1–8 hold. Then for all n ≥ n and all (x, z) ∈ Y (n), the
values of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) and γ (x, τn (x, z)) are identified.
Proof. We proceed by induction, starting with n = n. By the normalization (1),
γ (x0, 0) = 0, where for some z we have (x0, z) ∈ Y (n). Lemma 1 then implies
identification of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n). Lemma 2 then implies identi-
fication of γ (x, τn (x, z)) for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n). Now take any n > n and suppose that
γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) is known for all (x, z) ∈ Y (n− 1). By Assumption 7 there exists a
point (x̃, z̃) in Y (n− 1)∩Y (n). Since we have already identified γ (x̃, τn−1 (x̃, z̃)), by
Lemma 1 we also know the value of γ (x, τn−1 (x, z)) for all (x, z) in Y (n). By Lemma
2, this implies identification of γ (x, τn (x, z)) for all (x, z) in Y (n) . 
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1–9, τn−1 (Xt, Zt) is continuous in Zt on the pre-image
67Note that the arguments used to show Lemmas 1 and 2 will often imply several forms of overiden-
tification. For example, Lemma 1 implies overidentification of γ (x′, τm (x
′, z′))− γ (x, τm (x, z)) for
any m which is both smaller than min {n (x′, z′) , n (x, z)} and larger than max {n (x′, z′) , n (x, z)}.
And while Assumption 7 ensures only that there exist one (x̃, z̃) ∈ Y (n) that is also in Y (n− 1),
when there is more than one such pair the proof of Lemma 2 will provide multiple ways of construct-
ing the same value of a given difference γ (x′′, τn (x
′′, z′′))− γ (x′, τn−1 (x′, z′)). Finally, in practice
there may often be more than one value of n∗ satisfying Assumption 8, resulting in some duplication
in the differences identified in the two halves of the proof of Lemma 2.
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of (0, 1) .
Proof. Fix n, x, and z such that τn−1(x, z) ∈ (0, 1). Let τ = τn−1(x, z) and let
ν > 0 be sufficiently small that τ + ν < 1 and τ − ν > 0. We show that for any
such ν there exists ε > 0 such that for every z′ satisfying ‖z′ − z‖ < ε we have
τn−1(x, z
′) ∈ (τ − ν, τ + ν). Let δ = ν/2. By the definition of τn−1(x, z) and weak
monotonicity of η in Ut, η(x, z, τ − δ) < n. So by Assumption 9 there exists ε1 > 0
such that for any z′ satisfying ‖z′ − z‖ < ε1, η(x, z′, τ ′) < n for some τ ′ ∈ (τ − 2δ, τ).
Similarly, because η(x, z, τ + δ) ≥ n, Assumption 9 ensures that there exists ε2 > 0
such that for any z′ satisfying ‖z′− z‖ < ε2, η(x, z′, τ ′′) ≥ n for some τ ′′ ∈ (τ, τ + 2δ).
Letting ε = min{ε1, ε2}, we have shown that for any z′ satisfying ‖z′ − z‖ < ε,
η(x, z′, τ ′) < n for some τ ′ ∈ (τ − ν, τ) while η(x, z′, τ ′′) ≥ n for some τ ′′ ∈ (τ, τ + ν).
At such z′, τn−1(x, z
′) must lie in [τ ′, τ ′′]. 
C Random Reserve Price
As discussed in section 7.1, the MMS occasionally exercised its right to reject all bids,
typically when the number or level of bids received was low. Following Hendricks,
Porter, and Spady (1989) and Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson (1994), we model this
rejection policy by assuming that at each auction t the MMS used a random reserve
price Rt whose realization was unknown to bidders.
We let the distribution of Rt vary with the number of bidders and with the auction
characteristics (Xt, Ut). The dependence on (Xt, Ut) is assumed to mirror that of tract
valuations. Thus, we assume
Rt = R
0
t × Γ(Xt, Ut),
where R0t is independent of (Xt, Ut, St, Vt) conditional on Nt. In this formulation, a
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homogenized winning bid M0t is accepted if and only if M
0
t ≥ R0t . Let HR(·|Nt) denote
the distribution of R0t given Nt.
Following Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003), for each value of n we model the distri-
bution HR(·|n) using the marginal distribution of homogenized bids in an n-bidder
auction. However, to fit the data, we allow the MMS “bid” to be less aggressive than
a real bid by introducing a scaling factor σn.










Thus, the random reserve price has the same distribution as a rescaled bid.
Motivated by the observed rejection frequencies (see Table 13 below), we estimate
separate scaling factors for n = 1, n ∈ {2, 3} and n ≥ 4. Taking the estimates
of θ = (θτ , θγ, θb) as given, we fit these scaling parameters σ to the observed bid
acceptance decisions
Yit = 1{Mit ≥ Rt}





τnt(xt, zt; θ̂τ )− τnt−1(xt, zt; θ̂τ )









mt − γ(xt, u; θ̂γ)|nt; θ̂b, σ
))1−yt
du. (C.1)
Table 13 shows the actual and fitted bid acceptance rates for each value of n.
Introducing the random reserve price requires only a minor change in the inversion
of bidder first-order conditions. Under the null hypothesis of private values, bidders’
68Very similar results are obtained fitting a lognormal distribution for R0t or allowing the homog-
enized reserve price to be correlated with the homogenized bids.
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This allows testing of the private values null as in the baseline model.
An nuance here is that under the alternative of common values, the right-hand
side of (C.2) is not equal to w0(sit, sit;nt) but to a weighted average
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ϕ(sit, nt)w





∣∣∣∣Sit = sit,maxj 6=i Sjt ≤ sit, Nt = nt
]
(C.4)
denotes a bidder’s expected (homogenized) valuation conditional on his signal and




















Observe that all weight is placed on the pivotal expected value when the rejection probability
1−H(b0it, nt) is zero.
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on winning the auction. This expectation is slightly different from the homogenized
pivotal expected value. And although both w0(sit;nt) and w
0(sit;nt) are decreasing
in nt in a common values model, the weights ϕ(sit, nt) also vary with nt, leaving an
ambiguous prediction regarding how the distribution of the weighted average varies
with nt. This implies that violations of the private values null might fail to reveal
themselves, and further that there may be no relationship between the estimated
distributions obtained from the first-order condition that can be explained only by
violation of the model’s maintained hypotheses.
Given the stochastic ordering we do find, this caveat implies that the evidence we
obtain in favor of common values from this specification is conditioned on a main-
tained assumption that our model is correctly specified. Such conditioning is typical
in hypothesis testing but unlike the baseline specification, where we could partition
the set of all possible outcomes to those consistent with private values, those consis-
tent with common values, and those inconsistent with the model.
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D Additional Results and Tables
D.1 Baseline Specification Fine Binning Test Results
Table 14: Test p-values
Baseline Specification, Fine Binning
Test for Common Values
With UH No UH
2 vs. 3 0.001 0.046
3 vs. 4 0.212 0.703
4 vs. 5 0.662 0.869
5 vs. 6 0.625 0.733
6 vs. 7 0.073 0.270
Max 0.019 0.541
Specification Test
With UH No UH
2 vs. 3 1.000 1.000
3 vs. 4 0.730 0.229
4 vs. 5 0.567 0.086
5 vs. 6 0.627 0.249
6 vs. 7 0.562 0.440
Max 0.922 0.239
D.2 Parameter Estimates: Alternative Specifications
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Table 15: Entry Model Estimates
Alternative Specifications
No Year FE No Drainage SNP
Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB)
# active leases X -0.102 0.026 0.031 -0.036 0.037 0.044 -0.094 0.042
isolated lease 0.402 0.086 0.096 0.434 0.129 0.141 0.557 0.141
# firms that bid for neighbors 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.052 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.015
reoffered tract -0.293 0.062 0.069 -0.108 0.093 0.106 -0.242 0.093
neighbor expired -0.053 0.068 0.074 0.017 0.092 0.108 -0.022 0.104
# neighbors drilled -0.011 0.027 0.029 -0.090 0.041 0.042 -0.053 0.040
# neighbor hits 0.055 0.028 0.027 -0.353 0.253 0.254 0.077 0.038
depth -0.111 0.162 0.360 -0.704 0.198 0.309 -0.612 0.336
depth squared -0.060 0.065 0.234 0.174 0.073 0.133 0.121 0.153
royalty rate 0.024 0.015 0.020 -0.012 0.023 0.031 -0.004 0.026
time controls Sale year dummies Sale year dummies Sale year dummies
# neighbor firms Z 0.151 0.040 0.041 0.046 0.070 0.073 0.182 0.059
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Table 16: Index Function Estimates
Alternative Specifications
SNP No time FE No Drainage
Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB)
# active leases X 0.013 0.018 0.022 -0.006 0.027 0.027 0.006 0.023 0.030
isolated lease 0.060 0.060 0.091 0.027 0.079 0.111 0.048 0.085 0.123
# firms that bid for neighbors 0.032 0.008 0.011 0.052 0.010 0.013 0.036 0.013 0.019
reoffered tract -0.182 0.048 0.070 -0.245 0.078 0.091 -0.102 0.064 0.093
neighbor expired -0.277 0.047 0.068 -0.119 0.062 0.083 -0.203 0.060 0.087
# neighbors drilled 0.047 0.020 0.025 0.122 0.027 0.028 0.058 0.029 0.042
# neighbor hits -0.021 0.020 0.026 -0.047 0.028 0.031 -0.096 0.177 0.219
depth -0.248 0.137 0.274 1.203 0.146 0.365 -0.442 0.160 0.297
depth squared 0.094 0.065 0.120 -0.307 0.064 0.186 0.161 0.071 0.124
royalty rate -0.007 0.010 0.017 0.029 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.023
time controls Sale year dummies Sale year dummies Sale year dummies
unobserved heterogeneity U 1.319 0.291 0.405 1.989 0.584 0.646 0.941 0.358 0.513
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Table 17: Copula Correlation Estimates
Alternative Specifications
SNP No time FE No Drainage
n Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB) Est. SE SE (BB)
2 0.043 0.041 0.050 0.197 0.049 0.051 0.024 0.056 0.060
3 0.031 0.030 0.040 0.212 0.040 0.042 0.007 0.033 0.047
4 0.090 0.031 0.032 0.275 0.038 0.038 0.053 0.034 0.036
5 0.136 0.030 0.041 0.301 0.031 0.042 0.111 0.035 0.042
6 0.112 0.035 0.037 0.259 0.032 0.042 0.083 0.034 0.036
7 0.111 0.044 0.043 0.342 0.061 0.041 0.090 0.043 0.040
8 0.133 0.039 0.040 0.261 0.039 0.052 0.160 0.052 0.046
9 0.295 0.071 0.067 0.400 0.076 0.073 0.290 0.071 0.082
10 0.158 0.051 0.068 0.307 0.055 0.055 0.155 0.053 0.063
11- 18 0.108 0.025 0.020 0.246 0.029 0.031 0.098 0.026 0.026
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E Additional Computational Detail
Here we discuss additional computational aspects of our estimation procedure. A use-
ful feature of the Bernstein polynomial specification is the ease of imposing otherwise
complex functional restrictions through linear restrictions on the vector of Bernstein
coefficients. For instance, a necessary and sufficient condition for the function to inte-




b,n = m+ 1. Additionally, the Bernstein polynomials allow
easy transformation between the density and associated cumulative distribution. In
particular,
G̃B0i (b̃












where θ̃b,n = (θ̃
(0)
b,n, . . . , θ̃
(m+1)
b,n )
′ = Mθb,n for a known matrix M , and θ̃b = {θ̃b,n}nn=n.
This is useful because we require the CDF of the bid marginal when applying the
copula χ(·; ρn) to compute the joint density in (13). In contrast to numerical integra-
tion, the transformation from density to CDF with Bernstein polynomials involves
only a linear transformation of parameters and is exact.
One key computational issue is how one can derive tractable expressions for
the conditional distributions that appear in the bid first-order condition (15). Be-





it|b̃0it, n) using integrals of known normal distributions, which are eas-
ily computed using readily available methods. We first derive an expression for
G̃M |B(b̃
0
it|b̃0it, n). An expression for g̃M |B(b̃0it|b̃0it, n) follows naturally.
First, note that
G̃M |B(b|b, n) = Pr
(


















∣∣ Φ−1 (G̃B0i (B̃01t)) = b?) ,
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and we drop the dependence of G̃B0i on θ̃b and n for
notational convenience. The second equality holds for every b ∈ R, since the estimated
G̃B0i has always full support.
Second, note that the Gaussian copula parametrization of the joint distribution















where Σρn is the covariance matrix with constant pairwise correlation ρn.
Finally, the conditional normal distribution is also normal, so we can re-write the
conditional probability (E.2) as
















variance Σρn−ρn2. Therefore computation of G̃M |B(b|b, n) requires only the evaluation
of a known normal CDF.
This procedure naturally suggests one way of computing g̃M |B(b|b, n) as a multi-
variate integral. By definition,













By symmetry and using the Leibniz integral rule,






















, b3, . . . , bn
)
db3 . . . bn.
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where we drop the dependence of g̃B0i on θb and n. The integral above is over a
known multivariate normal density. It can be computed quickly and reliably using
the algorithm suggested by Genz (1992).
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